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A RACE OR A NATION? CHEROKEE NATIONAL IDENTITY AND 
THE STATUS OF FREEDMEN’S DESCENDENTS 
S. Alan Ray*
Abstract 
 Critics of tribal sovereignty increasingly point to perceived contradictions between 
the egalitarian ideals of modern democracies and the citizenship criteria of Indian nations 
to argue for diminished tribal sovereign immunity and increased federal intervention in 
Indian affairs. When tribes employ citizenship criteria based on Indian ancestry, they may 
be asked to explain why they are not engaging in immoral, if not unlawful, race-based 
discrimination. Strenuous assertions of tribal sovereignty may (or may not) convince critics 
of the right of federally-recognized tribes to engage in such conduct, but they do not go to 
the deeper question of how tribes ought to determine citizenship criteria from within their 
own norms and values. 
 The Cherokee Nation faces the challenge of determining its citizenship criteria as it 
pertains to the descendents of the Cherokee Freedmen. As former slaves of Cherokee 
citizens, the Freedmen were adopted after the Civil War and given full rights of Cherokee 
citizenship under a treaty with the United States. The incorporation of the Freedmen into 
the tribe was resisted from the start, and now, faced with a decision of the Cherokee 
Nation’s highest court affirming the descendants’ citizenship rights, the Nation prepares to 
vote on a constitutional amendment which would impose an Indian “blood quantum” 
requirement for citizenship based on the federal Dawes Rolls of the allotment era.  If 
approved, potentially thousands of African-descended citizens would be eliminated from 
the tribal registry. These citizens ask, is the Cherokee Nation a race or a nation? Other 
Cherokees rejoin that citizenship in an Indian tribe should be restricted to persons of Indian 
ancestry. In this Article, Professor Ray examines the legal and social history of the 
Cherokee Freedmen to criticize definitions of Cherokee political identity based on either 
the Dawes Rolls or notions of “Indian blood.” Both, he argues, are heteronymous 
authorities for determining tribal citizenship criteria and should be replaced by the critical 
hermeneutic of indigenous cultural resources. Professor Ray offers a model for 
constructing tribal citizenship criteria that attempts to deliver ancestry from biology, and 
law from legal fetishism of the Dawes Rolls. The wise use of sovereignty, he suggests, 
requires sustained dialogue between Freedmen’s descendents and Cherokees by ancestry, 
not the “quick fix” of the political process. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Cherokee Nation1 stands at a crossroads.  On March 7, 2006, the 
Nation’s highest court in Lucy Allen v. Cherokee Nation reversed itself 
and ruled that the descendents of former slaves owned by Cherokee 
citizens—the Cherokee Freedmen—were citizens of the Nation under its 
Constitution of 1975.2 The Court’s decision provoked immediate and 
 
* Senior Vice Provost and Affiliate Associate Professor of Political Science, 
Philosophy, and Justice Studies, University of New Hampshire. J.D., University of 
California, Hastings College of the Law; Ph.D., Harvard University Graduate School of 
Arts and Sciences (The Study of Religion). 
1 Hereinafter “the Cherokee Nation” or “the Nation.”  The entity is also known 
popularly as “the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma.” 
2 Lucy Allen v. Cherokee Nation Tribal Council, Lela Ummerteske, Registrar, and 
Registration Committee (JAT-04-09), March 7, 2006 (hereinafter “Lucy Allen”), 
http://www.cherokee.org/docs/news/Freedman-Decision.pdf (last visited August 16, 2006), 
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strong reaction from tribal leadership, Freedmen’s descendents, and many 
of the Nation’s citizens. On June 12, 2006, the Tribal Council passed a 
resolution to amend the Constitution to grant citizenship only to 
Cherokees listed on the Dawes Rolls or their descendants with a degree of 
Cherokee “blood” or adopted Delaware or Shawnees.3 African Americans 
who trace their ancestry to the Cherokee Freedmen felt keenly the 
exclusionary effects of the Council’s action and anticipated their potential 
expulsion from the tribe’s political life should the vote on the amendment 
in June 2007 go against them. The Nation prepares to perform its 
sovereign right to establish its citizenship criteria, therefore, in a social 
context marked by racial division. At issue is whether the Cherokee 
Nation should legally exclude members, present and future, who have no 
demonstrable “Indian blood,” and more fundamentally, whether the 
political identity of the Cherokee Nation centers on biology or law. 
 This Article examines the Cherokee Freedmen controversy to assess 
whether law and biology can function as sufficient models for crafting 
Cherokee identity at this crucial moment in the tribe’s history.  I will argue 
that while law and biology are historically powerful frames for establishing 
tribal self-identity, they are inadequate to the task of determining who 
should enjoy national citizenship.  The wise use of sovereignty, I will 
suggest, lies in creating a process of sustained dialogical engagement 
among all citizens of the Cherokee Nation on the question of Cherokee 
identity.  This dialogue should ideally be undertaken before the Nation 
moves to the political solution of a vote on tribal citizenship criteria. The 
 
reversing Riggs v.  Ummerteskee (JAT-97-03-K), August 15, 2001, 
http://www.freedmen5tribes.com/pdf/Riggs_Vs_Ummerteskee_JAT97_03_K.pdf (last 
visited August 16, 2006). “Constitution” when capitalized refers to the Constitution of the 
Cherokee Nation. “Court” when capitalized refers to the Judicial Appeals Tribunal (JAT), 
the supreme court of the Nation. The Lucy Allen Court addressed itself to the document 
variously referred to as the “the 1975 Constitution” or “the 1976 Constitution.” The same 
document was approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on September 5, 1975, and 
was ratified by the Cherokee people on June 26, 1976. Cherokee Nation Tribal 
Government, http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=government (last visited 
August 16, 2006). This Article will refer to “the 1975 Constitution” in deference to the 
Court’s preferred term. At the time the Court decided Lucy Allen, the Cherokee Nation had 
popularly approved a new organic document, drafted after constitutional convention in 
1999 (hence “the 1999 Constitution”) and approved by referendum in 2003. However, 
because the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) had not approved the 1999 Constitution, the 
Lucy Allen Court was operating under the 1975 Constitution.  The 1999 Constitution does 
not address itself to the status of the Freedmen’s descendents and makes no substantive 
change to the 1975 Constitution regarding criteria for citizenship. See Comparison of the 
1976 and 1999 Constitutions, 
http://www.cherokee.org/TribalGovernment/Executive/CCC/ccc1999Changes.pdf (last 
visited August 16, 2006). 
3 A Resolution Proposing an Amendment to Article III, Section I of the Cherokee 
Nation Constitution and Pursuant to Article XV, Section 2, Imposing a Degree of Indian 
Blood Requirement for Citizenship into the Cherokee Nation, 
http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=tcmagenda&agenda=tcm061206 (last visited 
August 16, 2006). On the adoption of the Shawnee and Delaware, see infra notes 12-13 and 
accompanying text. 
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exclusion of the Freedmen’s descendents without such a dialogue could 
have high political and social costs to the Nation, its members, and its 
potential former members.   The dialogue I propose could be constructed 
along the lines suggested by sociologist Eva Garroutte, whose model of 
Radical Indigeneity offers one means of considering these complex issues 
from within the Cherokee community itself. 
I will begin by providing an overview of the Court’s decision in Lucy 
Allen and the response of the Tribal Council in seeking to amend the 
Constitution. I will then examine the adequacy of legal and biological 
definitions to establish Cherokee identity in the context of the Freedmen 
controversy. Finding both inadequate to this larger task, I will present the 
alternative of Radical Indigeneity and explore how it could be a resource for 
the tribe in resolving the current crisis of Cherokee identity.  
 
I. LUCY ALLEN AND THE CHEROKEE FREEDMEN CONTROVERSY 
On March 7, 2006, the Judicial Appeals Tribunal of the Cherokee 
Nation issued its long-awaited opinion in the case of Lucy Allen. In a 2-1 
decision,4 the supreme court of the second-largest Indian nation in the 
country ruled that descendants of freed slaves of the Cherokee 
(“Freedmen”)5 were entitled to citizenship. Cherokee Freedmen were 
African-descended people who had been owned by Cherokees until their 
emancipation by the Nation in 1863.6 Under the terms of the Treaty of 1866 
reconciling the Cherokees with the United States, the tribe agreed to adopt 
the Freedmen as citizens and amended its Constitution accordingly.7 Many 
Freedmen and their descendants, though not all, were listed on the Final 
Rolls of the Dawes Commission which were, and are, the exclusive means 
by which to establish Cherokee Nation citizenship.8
Petitioner Lucy Allen “is a descendent of individuals listed on the 
Dawes Commission Rolls as ‘Cherokee Freedmen.’”9 Allen sought a 
declaration that language in the Cherokee statutes requiring that citizenship 
be “derived only through proof of Cherokee blood”10 was unconstitutional 
 
4 Stacy L. Leeds, J., Darrell Dowty, J. (concurring), Darrell R. Matlock, Jr. 
(dissenting). 
5 In this Article “Freedmen” refers to the freed slaves themselves. I indicate their 
descendents separately (“Freedmen and their descendents”). Conventional denotation often 
uses “the Freedmen” to refer alternately to the historically emancipated class of persons 
and to their descendents, allowing context to make clear which group is meant. 
6 The Cherokee National Council had emancipated all slaves “within the limits of the 
Cherokee Nation” in 1863. DANIEL F. LITTLEFIELD, JR., THE CHEROKEE FREEDMEN: FROM 
EMANCIPATION TO AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 16 (1978). 
7 See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
9 Lucy Allen, at 1.  
10 11 C.N.C.A. § 12 (A).  The Court also struck down on the same grounds 11 
C.N.C.A. § 12 (B), which states, “The Registrar will issue tribal membership to a person 
who can prove that he or she is an original enrollee listed on the Final Rolls [Dawes Rolls] 
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“because it is more restrictive than the membership criteria set forth in 
Article III of the 1975 Constitution.”11 Article III, Section 1 of the 1975 
Constitution provides: 
 
All members of the Cherokee Nation must be citizens as proven 
by reference to the Dawes Commission Rolls, including the 
Delaware Cherokees of Article II of the Delaware Agreement 
dated the 8th day of May 1867, and the Shawnee Cherokees as of 
Article III of the Shawnee Agreement dated the 9th day of June, 
1969, and/or their descendents.12 
All parties agreed that the Freedmen and their descendents, if they 
appeared on the Dawes Rolls, were “citizens” prior to the enactment of the 
1975 Constitution.  The Dawes Rolls consist of multiple rolls whose pages 
(apropos the Nation) are captioned, “Cherokee by Blood,” “Minor 
Cherokees by Blood,” “Cherokee Freedmen,” “Minor Cherokee Freedmen,” 
“Delaware Cherokee,” and “Intermarried Whites.”13 The Nation argued that 
the voters intended to exclude the Freedmen and therefore no mention of 
them was made in Article III. The Court rebuffed that argument, noting that 
Article III was also silent on the inclusion of Cherokees by “blood,” yet no 
one would argue that they were excluded from citizenship. In fact, the 1975 
Constitution makes no legal distinction among the different Dawes Rolls 
and therefore does not single out for tribal citizenship only those who 
appear or whose descendents appear on a roll of Indians by “blood.” 
Consequently, the Lucy Allen Court held that the Freedmen and their 
descendents did not lose their citizenship as a result of the adoption of the 
1975 Constitution and subsequent legislation imposing a “blood” 
requirement for tribal citizenship was unconstitutionally restrictive.14 The 
Court made clear that the Dawes Rolls are the touchstone for all Cherokee 
political rights: “[T]he 1975 Constitution affirms these rights by linking 
citizenship to one single document: the Dawes Rolls.”15 
by blood or who can prove to at least one direct ancestor listed by blood on the Final 
Rolls.” 
11 Lucy Allen, at 1. 
12 CONSTITUTION OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, art. III, §1 (1975).  
13 Because the Cherokee Nation had agreed to the federal government’s request after 
the Civil War to adopt as citizens Shawnee and Delaware tribal members, there are also 
separate pages captioned “Delaware Cherokee,” while Shawnee are included on the 
Cherokee by Blood roll and indicated accordingly.  Thus it is possible from the Dawes 
Rolls to determine to a legal if not moral certainty, who is a person with “Indian blood” and 
by the principle of exclusion, who is not.  Under the taxonomy of tribal citizenship 
established by the Dawes Rolls it is not necessary to have “Cherokee blood”—the cases of 
the Shawnee and Delaware, intermarried whites, and Freedmen demonstrate that legal 
relationships of adoption or marriage are sufficient to qualify one (and one’s descendents) 
for citizenship. 
14 Lucy Allen, at 22 (“11 C.N.C.A. § 12 adds a ‘by blood’ requirement [for citizenship] 
that simply does not exist in Article III.”).  
15 Id. at 4. 
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As a result of the Lucy Allen decision, as many as 45,000 people of 
African descent may choose to be added to a citizenship base of 
approximately 240,000.16 The decision provoked strong reaction from the 
Cherokee leadership.  Concered that “three people” could “change[] the last 
30 years of Cherokee governance,” Principal Chief Chad Smith called for a 
popular vote, where the issue of whether to amend the Constitution could be 
decided “at the polls . . . once and for all.”17 Marilyn Vann, President of the 
Descendants of Freedmen of the Five Civilized Tribes, denounced such a 
move as a transparent effort to deny black Cherokees their rightful place in 
the Cherokee polity.  She asked, “Is the Cherokee Nation a ‘race’ or a 
‘nation’?”18 
Chief Smith, in a lengthy statement, rejoined that the delegates voting to 
approve the 1975 Constitution intended to exclude the Freedmen’s 
descendants, and those delegates believed “that an Indian nation should be 
composed of Indians.”19 The Tribal Council agreed with Chief Smith that 
the question was ripe for political decision by the voters, and on June 12, 
2006, in a 13-2 vote, approved an amendment “which will exclude 
Freedmen from the tribe's rolls.”20 In the same meeting, so eager for 
political action were some proponents of the amendment that the Council 
 
16 Between March 7, 2006 (the day Lucy Allen was decided) and May 1, 2006, 
approximately 800 Freedmen’s descendents became citizens of the Nation. About 800 
Cherokee Freedmen Enrolled Since Decision, May 1, 2006, 
http://www.indianz.com/News/2006/013718.asp (last visited August 16, 2006). 
17 “By a 2 to 1 vote, three people essentially changed the last 30 years of Cherokee 
Nation governance. . . . I believe the Cherokee people should answer the question once and 
for all of who should be entitled to Cherokee citizenship as well as the status of the 
Freedmen.”  Citizen Views Fall on Both Sides of Freedmen Issue, March 27, 2006, 
www.cherokee.org (follow “Government” hyperlink; then follow “Executive” hyperlink; 
then follow “Chief’s Corner” hyperlink) (last visited August 16, 2006) (hereinafter 
“Freedmen Statement”). Chief Smith is officially neutral on the merits: "I want to make 
sure that my position on this is that I'm not advocating for or against the Freedmen. My 
position on this is that it's such a monumental issue, the people should decide, and that's the 
whole purpose.” Freedmen Debate Spreads to Communities, Cherokee Phoenix and Indian 
Advocate, August 2006, www.cherokee.org (follow “Phoenix” hyperlink; then follow 
“Archives” hyperlink”) (last visited August 16, 2006). However, he is widely perceived in 
the press as supporting the amendment.  See, e.g., Cherokee Chief Wants Freedmen Out of 
Tribe, March 15, 2006, http://www.indianz.com/News/2006/012980.asp) (last visited 
August 16, 2006); Cherokee Chief Criticized for Stance on Freedmen, March 17, 2006, 
http://www.indianz.com/News/2006/013017.asp) (last visited August 16, 2006); Cherokee 
Leader Wants to Overturn Freedmen Decision, 2006, 
http://www.kten.com/Global/story.asp?S=4633347 (last visited August 16, 2006). 
18 Cherokee Chief Calls for an “Indian” Nation by Blood, March 20, 2006, 
http://indianz.com/News/2006/013060.asp (last visited August 16, 2006). 
19 Freedmen Statement, supra note 17. 
20 Council Amends Constitution to Exclude Freedmen, Cherokee Phoenix and Indian 
Advocate, July 2006, www.cherokee.org (follow “Phoenix” hyperlink; then follow 
“Archives” hyperlink”) (last visited August 16, 2006). The Phoenix reported that 
“Councilors Bill Baker, Audra Conner, Jackie Bob Martin, David Thornton, Don Garvin, 
Linda O'Leary, Melvina Shotpouch, Johnny Keener, Meredith Frailey, Cara Cowan-Watts, 
Bill Johnson, Buel Anglen and Chuck Hoskin voted to amend the constitution. Councilors 
Joe Crittenden and Phyllis Yargee voted against the measure.”  Id. 
20-Aug-06] CHEROKEE FREEDMEN 7
narrowly turned back a motion that would have required a special election 
by November 4, 2006, to settle the question; undeterred, supporters of the 
special election began a petition drive to achieve their objective.21 The 
Council’s action placed the proposed amendment on the ballot of the June, 
2007, general election. Because Lucy Allen affirmed Freedmen’s 
descendents’ citizenship, these African-descended Cherokees will have the 
opportunity to vote on the amendment; already many who are eligible but 
not yet members are registering for tribal citizenship.22 Whether or not they 
are successful at the polls, the history of the Freedmen’s relationship with 
the Cherokee Nation does not suggest that the question of Cherokee 
political and social identity will be answered by a single election. 
 
II. THE FREEDMEN CONTROVERSY AS A CRISIS OF POLITICAL  
AND SOCIAL IDENTITY 
A. A Race or a Nation? Identity by Blood or Base Roll 
 
Freedmen descendent Marilyn Vann’s succinct statement of the 
problem, “Is the Cherokee Nation a ‘race’ or a ‘nation’?,”23 offers a choice 
between a conception of the tribe as a genealogical club whose members 
share a common lineage, and a notion of the tribe as a political sovereign 
whose citizenship criteria do not discriminate on the basis of race. In 
support of the latter alternative, Vann observes that “[t]he federal 
government does not have government to government relationships with 
‘races’ but with nations.”24 
Vann’s otherwise valid point obscures the fact that such government-
to-government relationships are, as to tribal governments, with Indian 
nations, thus begging the question, when, if ever, Cherokee Nation 
citizenship can be divorced from the Native American genealogy of 
Cherokee Nation members.  As Chief Smith observed, some Cherokees 
believe “an Indian nation should be composed of Indians.”25 Put in such 
stark terms, the choice for Cherokee Nation voters in 2007 comes down to 
selecting a political identity based on biology or law—opting for tribal 
 
21 Id. (“The vote on the resolution calling for a special election was 8-7. At least 10 
votes or two-thirds of the council was needed to call for a special election.”). Freedmen’s 
descendents were relieved that a special election would not be held: “Leslie Ross of Suisun 
City, Calif., a Cherokee citizen by blood and a Freedmen, attended the council meeting to 
support other Freedmen and thought it was "good we won't have a special election." He 
said the councilors who want ‘to kick us out’ should read the tribe's history. Part of that 
history, he said, includes his great-grandfather Stick Ross who served on the Tribal 
Council.” Id. On Freedmen’s participation in Cherokee governance during the late 
nineteenth century, see infra, note 100. 
22 See supra note 16. 
23 Cherokee Chief Calls for an “Indian” Nation by Blood, supra note 18. 
24 Id. 
25 Freedmen Statement, supra note 17. 
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citizenship by a show of “Indian blood” or by the appearance of an ancestor 
of any race simply because they appear on one of the Dawes Rolls. 
 The latter point deserves elaboration. As employed in the rhetoric of 
citizenship, “Indian blood” is a larger racial category than “Cherokee 
blood” and includes Dawes-enrolled Shawnees and Delawares and their 
descendents, who became Cherokee citizens as a result of treaties between 
the Nation and the United States after the Civil War.26 Significantly, the 
listings of Shawnees and Delawares on the Dawes Rolls indicate only 
degrees of Shawnee or Delaware “blood,” not degrees of “Cherokee blood,” 
if any, so Shawnees and Delawares remain Cherokee citizens by adoption,
like the Freedmen and intermarried whites, not citizens “by blood.” Yet, as 
Shawnees and Delawares, they are indigenous people and therefore 
potentially members by “Indian blood.” “Cherokees by blood” are 
denominated as such on the “Cherokee by blood” and “Minor Cherokees by 
blood” rolls. Further, although many of the Freedmen or their descendents 
at the time of enrollment may in fact have had Native American ancestry, 
such lineage was not recognized by the agents of the Dawes Commission, 
who consistently enrolled these “black Indians” under the Freedmen Roll.27 
Thus, amending the Constitution to impose a “Cherokee by blood” 
requirement, or status as a descendent of an adopted Shawnee or Delaware, 
according to the Dawes Rolls, would effectively eliminate only descendents 
of the Freedmen and intermarried whites, while de facto constructing a 
citizenship composed exclusively of “Indians by blood.” While “Indian 
blood” as established by the Dawes Rolls would be sufficient for tribal 
citizenship, “Cherokee blood” is now, and would continue to be, a 
prerequisite for holding elective office in the Nation.28 As a result of the 
proposed restructuring, then, out of the Dawes Rolls’ mixed taxonomy of 
race and law—“native Cherokees” and “adopted” citizens of various 
“bloods” and marital statuses—there would emerge a new race-based 
hierarchy of the Cherokee polity, with “Indians by blood” as its citizenry 
and “Cherokees by blood” as its leadership.29 
The impending vote to impose a “blood” requirement for citizenship, 
with the consequence that, if passed, hundreds if not thousands of African 
Americans in the tribe would be expelled, and thousands more precluded 
from citizenship, signals that the Cherokee Nation may be entering a crisis 
of political identity. The risks to tribal sovereignty are real: if the Cherokee 
 
26 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 207-215 and accompanying text. 
28 “The only time a legal right, under Cherokee law, depends on Cherokee blood, is 
when a person decides to run for elected office.  In that instance, we rely on the blood 
degree findings of the Dawes Commission to make sure our Principal Chief and Council 
members are Cherokee citizens by blood.  That guarantees Cherokee control of 
government, but that government is ultimately elected by a larger and more diverse 
constituency of citizens.”  Lucy Allen, at 9.  
29 Cognizant of the terms of the proposed amendment and its impact on Cherokee 
citizenship, throughout this Article the phrase “Indians by blood rolls” or “blood rolls” 
refers to those Dawes Rolls which list Cherokees by blood (adults and minors), Shawnees, 
and Delawares. 
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Nation acts to expel “its Freedmen”30 the Nation and its leadership may 
suffer severe reputational damages as a politically regressive and even racist 
enclave.  Already Oklahoma State Senator Judy Eason McIntyre and 
Representative Jabar Shumate have written an "open letter" to Chief Smith, 
alleging that his support of a blood quantum requirement and expulsion of 
the Freedmen’s descendents would create a "racist-based" citizenship 
system.31 The Cherokee lay advocate who represented Lucy Allen before 
the JAT, David Cornsilk, has said of Smith, simply, “he’s a racist.”32 
The perception that race is driving the issue of citizenship could only 
be enhanced by statements like those of former Cherokee Nation Deputy 
Chief, John Ketcher, who toured local Oklahoma communities in the 
summer of 2006 to collect signatures on a petition calling for a special 
election on the citizenship status of Freedmen’s descedents. In community 
meetings with tribal members, Ketcher said: 
We've always been people with Native American blood. People 
now want to come in because in the past some Cherokees held 
slaves. After the Civil War, as part of a treaty, we were forced to 
accept the Freedmen. It was done by the government to punish 
us. We are trying to rectify this and allow Cherokee people to 
vote on Cherokee membership.33 
Ketcher would accept admitting Freedmen’s descendants who could 
establish their “Indian blood.” As reported in the Cherokee Phoenix, the 
Nation’s paper of record, Ketcher “believes most Cherokee citizens have no 
problem with black citizens who have Cherokee blood or have blood from 
another tribe. ‘I think the majority of the Cherokees would probably vote to 
have those Freedman who are part Cherokee to be citizens and rightfully 
so,’ Ketcher said.”34 To Freedmen’s descendents like Marilyn Vann, 
 
30 The designation of “Freedmen” has been challenged by legal scholar Natsu Saito 
who argues that the term, as applied to the Seminoles of African descent, “implies that they 
were enslaved until freedom was bestowed upon them by an outsider or governmental 
source.” Natsu Taylor Saito, From Slavery and Seminoles to AIDS in South Africa: An 
Essay on Race and Property in International Law, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1135, 1173 (2000). 
31 Cherokee Leader Disputes Racially-tinged Allegations from Black Lawmakers, 
Native American Times, April 5, 2006, available at www.nativetimes.com (subscription) 
(last visited August 16, 2006); Cherokee Chief Criticized for Stance on Freedmen, supra 
note 17. 
32 Chief Not Ready to End Fight to Keep Out Freedmen, Muskogee Phoenix, March 
16, 2006, available at http://www.aaanativearts.com/article1323.html (last visited August 
16, 2006). In rejecting such an accusation, Principal Chief Smith said, “[It] is clear is that 
the Cherokee Nation Constitution is not based on race. People of many different ethnic 
backgrounds, African Americans, white Americans and Hispanic Americans, have 
Cherokee ancestors on the Dawes Roll; and they are unquestionably entitled to Cherokee 
Nation citizenship. However, someone will undoubtedly play the race card in this debate. 
The issue at hand is what classes of people should be citizens of the Cherokee Nation and 
who should make that decision, the courts or the Cherokee people themselves.” Freedmen 
Statement, supra note 17. 
33 Freedmen Debate Spreads to Communities, supra note 17. 
34 Id. 
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Ketcher’s reliance on “Indian blood” as the sine qua non of citizenship 
surely sounded like reliance on a racial criterion aimed at eliminating 
African-descended citizens from the Nation.35 
The recent example of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma also looms: in 
2000 the Seminoles attempted to amend their constitution to impose a blood 
quantum requirement that would have excluded Freedmen’s descendents 
from tribal citizenship. They did not submit the amendments to the BIA for 
approval, as required by their constitution.36 In 2001 the Seminoles relied 
on the unapproved amendments to conduct tribal elections for chief and 
council, thus disenfranchising Freedmen’s descendents. The BIA refused to 
recognize the Nation’s newly-elected leadership, and after a suit brought by 
the tribe, a federal district court agreed with the BIA.37 The crisis was 
resolved only after the Seminoles dropped the blood quantum requirement 
and the affected Freedmen’s bands held new elections.38 Although the legal 
posture of the two tribes differs greatly (the 1999 Cherokee Constitution 
does not require federal approval of its amendments, the Seminole 
Constitution did; Cherokee Freedmen’s descendants will be allowed to vote 
on their nation’s citizenship amendment, Seminole Freedmen’s 
descendents’ votes though cast were not counted), it is entirely conceivable 
that a federal court would finds grounds for intervention into Cherokee 
governmental affairs, perhaps by an expansive reading of the Indian Civil 
 
35 Vann countered by holding her own community meetings. Vann “said the Freedmen 
want to retain citizenship rights they have had for more than 140 years, and many of them 
have Indian blood with the documents to prove it. ‘Freedmen for the most part are 
Cherokee people who had rights before by treaty and under the 1975 and 1999 
constitutions,’ she said. Vann claims the Cherokee Nation has citizens on its rolls including 
Delawares, Shawnees and whites, but the council has not denied their rights to Cherokee 
citizenship. ‘The Nation was built by not just Cherokees, but by Freedmen, Delawares and 
Shawnees,’ she said. ‘Now the council is saying, “we don't need them anymore.”’”  Id. In 
fact, Keeler’s allowance for descendents of Dawes enrollees who have “blood from another 
tribe” would permit citizenship for adopted Shawnees and Delawares: it is a criterion based 
on “Indian blood” which would only exclude descendents of Freemen and intermarried 
whites who lacked demonstrable indigenous ancestry.  See supra notes 26-29 and 
accompanying text. 
36 The Seminole Nation unsuccessfully challenged the authority of the Department of 
the Interior to review and approve the amendments to the Seminole constitution. See 
Seminole Nation of Oklahoma v. Norton, 206 F.R.D. 1, 22 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding DOI 
has authority, pursuant to Article XIII of the Seminole Constitution, to approve 
amendments to the Seminole Constitution before they could be adopted and stating “DOI 
clearly expressed the basis for its objection to these amendments, pointing out that the 
Freedmen have been members of the Seminole Nation since 1866 and that their removal 
would violate both statute and treaty."). 
37 Seminole Nation v. Norton, 223 F. Supp 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2002) (upholding action of 
Secretary of the Interior to refuse recognition of newly-elected tribal government where 
votes of Freedmen’s descendents were not counted, and otherwise eligible citizens were 
prevented from running for office because of unlawful amendments to Seminole 
constitution).  
38 See letter from Neal A. McCaleb, Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs, to Seminole 
Chief Jerry G. Haney, December 19, 2003, 
http://www.indianz.com/docs/bia/mccaleb121902.pdf (last visited August 16, 2006). 
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Rights Act, viewing expulsion of Freedmen’s descendents as prohibited 
“banishment,” and thus triggering action under ICRA.39 
The political crisis of the Cherokee Nation also signals a crisis of social 
identity: what makes one a Cherokee? Indeed, the latter question underlies 
the political options of blood or base rolls, because how voters in 2007 will 
determine tribal citizenship criteria will depend upon how they variously 
recognize—and define—their fellow Cherokees. In the following section I 
will look at how one primary means of definition, namely, legal status has 
defined the Cherokee Freedmen and circumscribed their rights.40 
B. Cherokee Identity: Legal Definitions and their Limits 
 
Legal definitions play a prominent though not exclusive role in 
deciding Indian status. The object of definition may be collective (what is a 
tribe?) or individual (who is an Indian?) and may be determined outside a 
tribe (by a state or the federal government) or within a tribe (through tribal 
citizenship criteria).41 The history of the Cherokee Freedmen demonstrates, 
however, that legal definitions of citizenship that appear race-neutral (or 
more precisely, race-inclusive) have operated to enforce normative 
conceptions of the Cherokee Nation as a tribe properly by and for only 
persons possessing “Indian blood.” 
 
1. Collective Definitions: The Cherokee Nation 
 
The Cherokee Nation is one of three federally-recognized Cherokee 
governments, the others being the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians 
(composed of descendents of Cherokees who did not remove to Indian 
Territory in the 1830s) and the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee 
Indians (situated in northeastern Oklahoma and Arkansas and consisting of 
Cherokee cultural traditionalists).42 Not bounded by a reservation, the 
 
39 See Angela Riley, Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) 
(manuscript available from author) (advocating against expansion of ICRA or similar laws 
that would impede tribal self-governance); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
§ 4.01[2][b] (2005 ed.) (“[T]he Department of the Interior has taken the position that it may 
decline to continue government-to-government relations with a tribe’s elected officials if it 
finds that the tribal membership laws underlying voter eligibility for the election violate 
[ICRA] or the tribe’s own constitution.”). 
40 In her study of Native American identity formation, Eva Garroutte, herself a citizen 
of the Cherokee Nation, sets out four, competing definitions through which individuals and 
communities negotiate Indian identity.  Garroutte’s definitions of legal, biological, cultural, 
and self-identification identity formation are highly useful in understanding the forms of 
Native American self-identity.  See EVA MARIE GARROUTTE, REAL INDIANS: IDENTITY AND 
THE SURVIVAL OF NATIVE AMERICA 14-98 (2003). 
41 See id. at 14-37 (on the definition of Indian identity by law). 
42 RUSSELL THORNTON, THE CHEROKEES: A POPULATION HISTORY 138-43 (1990). In 
the absence of direct congressional action, which is rare, collective legal definitions of 
Indians today result from the Federal Acknowledgment Process (FAP). The FAP requires a 
tribe to show its historical continuity, political and communal integrity, and application of 
citizenship criteria that preclude members from belonging to other tribes. See 25 C.F.R. § 
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Cherokee Nation exercises sovereignty across its 14-county Tribal 
Jurisdictional Service Area in northeastern Oklahoma.43 Although 
jeopardized by the anti-sovereignty Curtis Act in 1898,44 the Cherokee 
Nation refers to the Five Civilized Tribes Act of 1906 and a key 1976 
federal court decision45 to establish its legal continuity with the tribe that 
walked the Trail of Tears in 1838-39. The Act of 1906 states that tribal 
governments “are hereby continued in full force and effect for all purposes 
authorized by law.”46 In the words of Chief Smith in 2006 during an 
occasion celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Act of 1906, “There is a 
great myth that the [Five] tribes went away when Oklahoma became a state. 
We have to remind ourselves and our neighbors that the five tribes have 
continued in full force and effect through this entire last century.”47 Smith 
reinforced the point following the Lucy Allen decision, when he stated: 
 
Regardless of one’s point of view, the Lucy Allen case 
reinforces the principle that the constitutional government of the 
Cherokee Nation is the same constitutional government formed 
in 1839. It properly destroys the falsehood that there is a new 
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma created in 1975 and an older 
Cherokee Nation with a constitution dated 1839. There is only 
one constitutional government of the Cherokee people since 
1839 and that simply is Cherokee Nation. The claim of 
Freedmen citizenship goes back to the 1866 amendment to the 
1839 Cherokee Nation Constitution.48 
83.7 (Mandatory Criteria for Federal Acknowledgement). A federally-recognized tribe 
receives the privileges and immunities incident to a government-to-government 
relationship with the United States. See Procedures for Establishing That an American 
Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe (25 C.F.R. § 83.2) (1994). The Eastern Band has 
enjoyed federal recognition since 1889. The United Keetoowah Band (UKB) organized 
under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 and the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 
1936 and received federal recognition in 1950.  The UKB self-describes as the “First 
Federally Recognized Tribe in Oklahoma,” 
http://www.unitedkeetoowahband.org/Documents/KeetoowahHistoryBooklet.pdf (last 
visited August 16, 2006). The Cherokee Nation would “awaken” its tribal government in 
the 1970s. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text. 
43 Cherokee Nation, Demographics, 
http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=demographics (last visited August 16, 2006).  
44 See discussion infra, notes 49, 51, 78 and accompanying text. 
45 See 34 Stat. 137 (April 26, 1906) (“Five Tribes Act”) and Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. 
Supp. 1110 (D.D.C. 1976).  In a decision focused on the Creek Nation but applicable to all 
the Five Tribes, the court ruled, “despite the general intentions of the Congress of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to ultimately terminate the tribal government of the 
Creeks, and despite an elaborate statutory scheme implementing numerous intermediate 
steps toward that end, the final dissolution of the Creek tribal government created by the 
Creek Constitution of 1867 was never statutorily accomplished, and indeed that 
government was instead explicitly perpetuated.”  Id. at 1118. 
46 34 Stat. 137 (April 26, 1906) sec. 28. 
47 5 Tribes Meet to Commemorate Historical Act, Cherokee Phoenix and Indian 
Advocate, June 2006, http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=phoenix&year=2006
(last visited August 16, 2006). 
48 Freedmen Statement, supra note 17. 
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A dramatic effect of the Curtis Act, however, was to deny the Nation 
the right to exercise autonomously its inherent sovereignty.49 After the 
Curtis Act, the Cherokee Nation continued to exercise minimal 
governmental functions, but especially after the creation of the State of 
Oklahoma on November 16, 1907, the Nation and its leadership became 
instruments of the federal government for many years—Cherokees 
frequently speak of the period from the Curtis Act to 1970 as one when the 
Nation was “sleeping.”  As Keetoowah Cherokee Robert Conley has written 
of the period following the Curtis Act, “Although nothing in the law 
prohibited Cherokees from electing their chief and council, a regime of 
bureaucratic imperialism had begun. For all practical purposes, the 
Cherokee nation had become dormant.”50 Cherokee sovereignty finally 
awakened in 1970, roused in large part by President Richard Nixon’s 
watershed repudiation of the federal policy of tribal termination 
(“termination is morally and legally unacceptable”) and endorsement of a 
policy of tribal self-determination.51 Congress, responding to President 
Nixon, quickly passed legislation giving tribes back the authority to elect 
their own leaders.52 
Between 1970 and 1999, the Nation’s population rose from 40,000 to 
over 200,000; while once concentrated almost exclusively in Oklahoma, 
citizens today span the country with significant concentrations in Arkansas, 
Texas and California.53 Since 1971, the Cherokee Nation has emerged as a 
model of Indian economic and cultural self-determination. By its own 
financial indicators, the Nation is enjoying strong growth in revenues 
generated in part by Cherokee Nation Enterprises (CNE), a diversified 
business wholly-owned by the tribe.54 CNE paid dividends of $15.0 million 
 
49 See Eric Lamont, Overcoming the Politics of Reform: The Story of the Cherokee 
Nation of Oklahoma Constitutional Convention, AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 6 (2003-2004) 
(“From 1907 through 1970, the Cherokee Nation functioned without a government. During 
this time, the U.S. Government appointed a Principal Chief, who did little more than 
approve leases and sign documents transferring out the last of the allotments.”). 
50 ROBERT J. CONLEY, THE CHEROKEE NATION: A HISTORY 202 (2005). The United 
Keetoowah Band (UKB) and the Nation have often clashed over Cherokee identity. See the 
history of the Keetoowah at the Band’s official website:  
http://www.unitedkeetoowahband.org/Documents/History/Essay1.htm (last visited August 
16, 2006) (“[T]he Keetoowahs have always been known to be the most traditional and 
conservative of the Cherokee, holding on to the old ways of the full-blood Cherokee. 
Legends say that if these ways ever discontinue, the Cherokee will be no more.”). 
51 Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for 
Indian Policy, H.R. Doc. No. 91-363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (July 8, 1970), in DAVID H. 
GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 218-20, 219 (5th ed. 2005).  The legal basis for the resurgence of 
Cherokee tribal sovereignty had been laid years earlier, with the repeal of the Curtis Act by 
the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936, which permitted tribes, inter alia, to adopt 
constitutions. 49 Stat. 1967(June 25, 1936) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §501 et seq.). 
52 Principal Chiefs Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-495, 84 Stat. 1091. 
53 Lamont, supra note 49, at 19. 
54 Data on the Cherokee Nation in this paragraph and the next, except where otherwise 
indicated, are found in Cherokee Nation Status Report 2005, www.cherokee.org (follow 
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into the Nation’s discretionary budget in 2005, up from $1.9 million in 
1998. CNE employed 2811 people in 2005, compared with 511 in 1998.  
Cherokee Nation Industries (CNI), a second corporation wholly-owned by 
the Nation, was started 35 years ago and today focuses on high-tech 
aerospace and military assembly. CNI’s profits have risen from $1.6 million 
in 2003 to $3.5 million in 2005.55 
Between fiscal 2001 and 2004, the Nation opened two new community 
health clinics which contributed to an increase of 49,000 patient visits, and 
made plans to open three more clinics in neighboring towns.  As federal 
funding for health care is decreasing, the Nation’s contribution to health 
services for tribal citizens is rising: from $49 million in fiscal year 2000, to 
$76 million in fiscal 2004.  In the 1997-98 academic year, the Nation 
supported 722 higher education scholarships for the Nation’s citizens; in 
2004-05, the number had grown to 2147. Under Chief Smith’s leadership, 
the Nation has made a sustained and successful effort to revitalize Cherokee 
language study and renew traditional cultural activities and awareness, 
especially among Cherokee youth.56 Today the Nation is widely recognized 
as a model of economic success and accounting integrity as well as a leader 
in innovative and effective cultural programming.57 
Ironically, the revival of the Cherokee Nation was assisted by the same 
constituency that is now facing expulsion. Conley writes that “[i]n 1971, the 
Cherokee Nation held its first election for Principal Chief since before 
Oklahoma statehood in 1907. . . . Voter eligibility was determined by the 
Dawes Rolls.” Among the citizens whose eligibility was determined by the 
Dawes Rolls and who cast votes in that first election were descendents of 
the Nation’s Freedmen.58 
“Government” hyperlink; then follow “Executive” hyperlink; then follow “Status Report” 
hyperlink) (last visited August 16, 2006). 
55 CNI recently suffered losses of an estimated $6.3 million due to investments in 
failed or failing energy ventures.  The SEC is investigating allegations of fraud in 
connection with the stock purchases. Cherokee Nation Businesses Losing Millions, July 28, 
2006, http://indianz.com/News/2006/015180.asp (last visited August 16, 2006). 
56 See, e.g., Cherokee Nation, Status Report 2005, Cherokee Speakers Sweep Youth 
Language Fair, http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=demographics.
57 See, e.g., twelve awards of the Certificate of Achievement for Excellence in 
Financial Reporting by the Government Financial Officers Association and multiple 
awards by the Honoring Nations Program of the Harvard Program for American Indian 
Economic Development (for the Cherokee National Youth Choir and the Cherokee Nation 
History Course); Cherokee Nation Status Report 2005, supra note 54 (GFOA awards); 
HPAIED Honoring Nations Directory, 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied/documents/HN_Directory_99-03.pdf (last visited 
August 16, 2006) (Honoring Nations awards).  
58 CIRCE STURM, BLOOD POLITICS: RACE, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY IN THE CHEROKEE 
NATION OF OKLAHOMA 178 (2002). The re-enfranchisement of the Freedmen’s 
descendents in 1971 was to be short-lived. In the 1983 tribal election, black-Cherokees like 
the Reverend Roger H. Nero who appeared at the polls were shocked to be informed that 
they could not vote: the tribe had determined that voter eligibility would be limited to 
Dawes Rolls descendents who possessed Indian blood. Id. See discussion infra at notes 92-
94 and accompanying text. 
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2. Individual Definitions: Citizenship in the Cherokee Nation 
 
Individual legal definitions of Indians are determined by the tribes 
themselves or, in some circumstances, by Congress.59 The United States 
Supreme Court in Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo upheld the right of tribes 
to determine their own criteria for citizenship consistent with retained tribal 
sovereignty and Congress’s intent to promote Indian self-government.60 
Except where Congress has acted to abridge their authority, tribes may 
determine their criteria for citizenship, even where, as in Martinez, the 
result disadvantages a class that would be protected under the federal 
Constitution’s equal protection guarantee, were it applicable.61 Martinez 
implicitly authorizes a host of different tribal citizenship-criteria: “blood 
quantum” is a common though not universal criterion; others include 
maternal or paternal descent, residency on the reservation, community 
participation, vote of the tribal council, community recognition or parental 
enrollment, performance of certain annual duties to the tribe, appearance of 
ancestors on specified base rolls, and marriage to or adoption by a tribal 
member.62 
Once recognized as a citizen, individuals may receive numerous and 
varied rights, depending upon the tribe. They may include voting rights, the 
right to run for and hold tribal office, preferential hiring by the tribe, access 
to tribal courts and subjection to tribal law, the right to receive tribal social 
services, the right to receive revenues generated by tribally-owned 
businesses, or the right to share in distributions derived from the 
exploitation of natural resources on or beneath tribal lands.63 
Because establishing tribal citizenship criteria is a function of a tribe’s 
political process, it is subject to all the vagaries of lawmaking and those 
who miss the opportunity, for example, to sign up when tribal base rolls are 
established are denied, and their descendents are denied, the chance for 
political participation “from the inside” unless the tribe makes an 
accommodation for them.  As Garroutte observes, such persons, though 
perhaps culturally or biologically Native American, and desirous of an 
 
59 Garroutte observes that “[a] 1978 congressional survey discovered no less than 
thirty-three separate definitions of Indians in use in different pieces of federal legislation.  
These may or may not correspond with those any given tribe uses to determine its 
citizenship.” GARROUTTE, supra note 40, at 16 (emphasis in original). 
60 46 U.S. 49 (1978). 
61 Id. In Martinez, the disadvantaged class was women. The federal Constitution does 
not apply to federally-recognized Indian tribes except to the extent required by the Indian 
Civil Rights Act (ICRA).  Significantly, Martinez held that federal courts’ power to review 
claims arising under ICRA was limited to the right of habeus corpus. See supra at note 49 
and accompanying text. 
62 GARROUTTE, supra note 40, at 15. See Christine Metteer, The Trust Doctrine, 
Sovereignty, and Membership: Determining Who Is  Indian, 5 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV.
53, 86 (2003) (arguing “tribes must be allowed to retain their various membership criteria 
because these criteria for determining who is and who is not a member are a statement of 
what makes the tribe unique.”). 
63 See GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 15-18 (various rights incident to tribal citizenship). 
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“official” Indian identity, are legally “not ‘real Indians.’ They are 
‘outaluck.’”64 
The former slaves of Cherokees were legally defined as tribal citizens 
when the Cherokee Nation signed a reconstruction treaty with the United 
States on July 19, 1886. By its terms, the Treaty of 1866 provided in 
relevant part that: 
 
[A]ll freedmen who have been liberated by voluntary act of their 
former owners or by law, as well as all free colored persons who 
were in the country at the commencement of the rebellion, and 
are now residents therein, or who may return within six months, 
and their descendents shall have the rights of native Cherokees.65 
In consequence of the Treaty, the Cherokee Nation promptly amended its 
Constitution: 
 
Art. 3, Sec. 5 . . . All native-born Cherokees, all Indians, and 
whites legally members of the nation by adoption, and all 
freedmen who have been liberated by voluntary act of their 
former owners or by law, as well as free colored persons who 
were in the country at the commencement of the rebellion, and 
are now residents therein, or who may return within six months 
from the 19th day of July, 1866, and their descendents who reside 
within the limits of the Cherokee Nation, shall be taken and 
deemed to be citizens of the Cherokee Nation.66 
Rather than settle the issue of the Freedmen’s legal status, however, the 
Treaty of 1866 and constitutional amendments of 1866 “set in motion what 
proved to be a torturous effort to determine precisely who qualified for the 
tribal rolls.”67 The confluence of the Treaty’s and Constitution’s six-month 
deadline for establishing residency, the dispersion of former slaves 
throughout the region due to war, and limited means of communicating vital 
information meant that many former slaves did not return in time to receive 
tribal citizenship—they were “outaluck”—and entered Cherokee history as 
the “too-lates”: 
 
The treaty specified that former slaves desiring Cherokee 
citizenship should present themselves by January 1867. During 
the war, however, many Cherokee slaves had fled the territory or 
 
64 Id. at 22.  The term “outalucks,” coined by historian Kent Carter, refers to “people of 
Indian ancestry who are nevertheless unable to negotiate their identity as Indians within the 
available legal definitions.”  Id. at 14 (citing Kent Carter, “Wantabees and Outalucks,” 66 
CHRONICLES OF OKLAHOMA 94-101 [1988]). 
65 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 944 (Charles J. Kappler, ed. 1904-1941; 
1975-76 printing).  
66 CONSTITUTION OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, Art. III, § 5 (amended 1866). 
67 ANDREW DENSON, DEMANDING THE CHEROKEE NATION: INDIAN AUTONOMY AND 
AMERICAN CULTURE 1830-1900 84 (2004). 
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had been taken out by their owners, and some freed people who 
otherwise qualified did not make it back in time.68 
The challenge facing the Freedmen of establishing Cherokee social 
identities under the circumstances of reconstruction were exacerbated by the 
early and sustained opposition of the Cherokee leadership to their legal 
identity as citizens.69 As anthropologist Circe Sturm observed in 2002, 
“Despite the promises of this treaty [of 1866], the freedmen were never 
fully accepted as citizens of the Cherokee Nation, and Cherokees to this day 
remain divided over the political and legal status of their former slaves.”70 
The matter of “black access to tribal resources” quickly became a focal 
point of Cherokee resistance to Freedmen’s citizenship.71 Sturm notes that 
“[i]n an attempt to solidify their own economic and political interests, in 
1883 the Cherokee tribal council passed legislation that excluded the 
freedmen and other tribal citizens without Cherokee blood, such as the 
Shawnees, Delawares, and intermarried whites, from sharing in tribal 
assets,” such as those realized from the sale of tribal lands.72 Cherokee 
politicians argued that the Freedmen and their descendents had only the 
right of occupancy, not ownership of tribal lands, and therefore were not 
entitled to share in the distribution of any sale proceeds absent the Council’s 
permission.73 
68 Id. Denson adds that “[o]thers had trouble proving that they had been Cherokee 
slaves, while some of those claiming citizenship had never been owned by Cherokees but 
had migrated to the Indian Territory after the war in hopes of securing land.”  Id. The 
confluence of slavery, war, and treaty law hit families especially hard. To reach the 
territory in time, some parents left behind spouses and children, and if the families were 
reunited after the six-month window had closed, federal agents could treat the late arrivals 
as territorial intruders and expel them. Children who had been separated from their families 
during slavery and sold often could not be reunited in time. Some minors had been bound 
to service until their majority; they too could not return in time to establish their 
citizenship. See MORRIS L. WARDELL, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE CHEROKEE NATION,
1838-1907 226 (1938; 1977) (citing 1870 report of Captain John Craig, a federal agent for 
the Cherokees, that “not a few [former slaves] were detained in slavery in Texas for one or 
two years after the war, or until they escaped.”).The harsh effects of the original deadline 
were partially mitigated in 1870 by amendments permitting slaves who had resided “in the 
Nation in 1861 to receive an allotment and citizenship whenever they returned to Indian 
Territory.” PERDUE, SLAVERY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CHEROKEE SOCIETY, 1540-1866 143 
(1979). 
69 See KATJA MAY, AFRICAN AMERICANS AND NATIVE AMERICANS IN THE CREEK AND 
CHEROKEE NATIONS, 1830S TO 1920S 71 (1996) (“From 1866 to 1876 freedmen could vote 
and serve on juries. . . . After 1877 [and the election of traditionalist Principal Chief 
Oochalata], the exercise of citizenship rights became difficult.”).   
70 STURM, supra note 58, at 171.  The political history of Freedmen’s citizenship after 
the Civil War, which I summarize in this section, unless otherwise indicated, is found id. at 
170-78.  
71 DENSON, supra note 67 at 85 (“Economic factors tended to drive the freedmen 
controversy.”). 
72 STURM, supra note 58 at 171. 
73 MAY, supra note 69, at 71. The irony of this position, of course, consists in its 
application of the same principles of Euroamerican property law used by the Marshall 
Court when it held tribes did not hold absolute title to aboriginal lands, only a right of 
18 TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY [20-Aug-06 
 
Congress responded, and passed legislation in 1888 that “required the 
tribe to share its assets equally with the freedmen and other adopted 
citizens.”74 To foster compliance with the law and rationalize the 
distribution of tribal assets, Congress called for an enrollment of all eligible 
Freedmen by a federal agent. In 1889, the agent produced the Wallace Roll, 
a record of 3,524 Freedmen or their descendents.  
 The Nation continued to resist the legal definition of Freedmen as 
Cherokee Nation citizens, prompting Congress in 1890 to authorize 
adjudication of the Nation’s obligations to the Freedmen in the Court of 
Claims. In Whitmire v. Cherokee Nation and the United States75 the Court 
of Claims ruled in favor of the Freedmen, holding that the grant of rights to 
Freedmen and their descendents by the Cherokee Nation under its 
Constitution (amended 1866), consistent with the Nation’s obligations 
under the Treaty of 1866, precluded the Nation from denying the Freedmen 
an equal share in the distribution of proceeds from the sale of communally-
owned land: 
 
When the Cherokee people wrote into their constitution in 1866 
“all nativeborn Cherokees, all Indians and whites legally 
members of the nation by adoption, and all freedmen,” “shall be 
taken and been deemed to be citizens of the Cherokee Nation,” 
they fixed the status of the freedman and raised him to the same 
rank of citizenship which they themselves enjoyed.  Thenceforth 
he was to be equal with themselves under the constitution, 
governed by the same laws, enjoying the same rights, possessed 
of the same immunities, and entitled to the same protection.76 
The Court of Claims awarded the Freedmen $903,365 as their share of 
$7,240,000 that had been realized from tribal land sales.  However, because 
the Nation had already distributed the entire amount to Cherokees by blood, 
and the United States was named as co-defendant, it fell to the federal 
government to pay the Freedmen. Not satisfied with the accuracy of the 
Wallace Roll, the government authorized a second recording, called the 
Kern-Clifton Roll, which was finished in 1896 and listed 5,600 Freedmen or 
their descendents.  Based on the Kern-Clifton Roll, the federal government 
satisfied the Whitmire judgment and awarded the legally-defined Cherokee 
Freedmen shares of profits from the sale of their tribal lands. 
 
occupancy, in Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). On Johnson as a 
foundational case for United States legal colonization of Native Americans, see ROBERT A. 
WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND 
THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 51-58 (2005). 
74 STURM, supra note 58, at 171; see 25 Stat. at L. 608-609. 
75 30 Ct. Cl. 138 (1895). 
76 Id. Counsel for the Cherokee Nation distinguished between the Freedmen’s “rights 
in the soil” (and proceeds of its sale), which they vigorously resisted conceding, and 
Freedmen’s “right to vote, to sit on juries, to sue and be sued, to receive the benefits of 
public schools and charities,” which they readily acknowledged “has never been questioned 
or abridged in the slightest.”  Id. (page cites unavailable). 
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The Freedmen’s rights to Cherokee Nation citizenship were defined 
once more when the federal government forced a new accounting on the 
Five Tribes in 1893, in furtherance of the General Allotment Act of 1887 
(popularly known as the Dawes Act).  The policy of the federal government 
in the nineteenth- and early twentieth centuries to assimilate Native 
Americans into the culture and ethos of non-Indian society included, at its 
heart, the inculcation of a love of private property, the sine qua non of
“civilized” peoples.  The Dawes Act called for the break-up of tribally-
owned land into individual allotments and their award in severalty to 
individual Indians and other qualified tribal members, including the 
Freedmen and their descendents. President Theodore Roosevelt in 1901 
called the Dawes Act “a mighty, pulverizing engine to break up the tribal 
mass,”77 seeing in its effects the end of tribal communities themselves and 
the assimilation of their members into mainstream, farming America, thus 
freeing the federal government of the anachronism of sovereign Indian 
nations and ending the federal trust responsibility to their members. The 
Dawes Act, and its politically potent successor the Curtis Act,78 represent 
the legal embodiment of the philosophical aspiration expressed in 1892 by 
the founder of the Carlisle Indian School, Colonel Richard Pratt, who stated 
that “all the Indian there is in the race should be dead. Kill the Indian in 
him, and save the man.”79 
Significantly, the Dawes Act introduced the use of “blood quantum”—
degrees of “Indian blood”—as a metric for alienability of allotments. On the 
theory that “full-blooded” Indians were less familiar with property 
ownership and therefore less competent to manage their affairs, Congress 
required that the land of any allottee of one-half degree “Indian blood” or 
more would be held in trust for a determined number of years, could not be 
sold, and would not be taxed; allotments to those with less than one-half-
degree “Indian blood” (including intermarried whites and Freedmen and 
 
77 President Theodore Roosevelt, First Annual Message, December 3, 1901, 
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/native_voices/voices_display.cfm?id=92 (last visited 
August 16, 2006). 
78 See discussion supra at notes 44, 49-51 and accompanying text. The Curtis Act of 
1898 accelerated the federal government’s attack on tribal sovereignty.  As legal scholar 
David E. Wilkins states: 
With this act, Congress unilaterally and indirect violation of treaty and 
statutory law, terminated the legal existence of the Five Civilized Tribes. This 
detailed measure provided for the establishment and regulation of townsites; 
for the management of leases of Indian mineral rights; authorized the Dawes 
Commission to create enrollment lists which would serve as the basis for 
deciding who received land allotments; prohibited the expansion of lands; and 
also abolished the court systems of the tribal governments in Indian territory. 
. . . [The Five Tribes were reduced] to a poverty status that would take 
decades for them to rise above. 
DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE 
MASKING OF JUSTICE 66-67 (1997).  
79 “Kill the Indian, and Save the Man”: Capt. Richard C. Pratt on the Education of 
Native Americans, http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/4929/ (last visited August 16, 2006). 
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their descendents) were subject to taxation but their owners could freely 
alienate their property.80 
In 1893 Congress created the Dawes Commission and charged it with 
negotiating with the Five Tribes for the end of communal land ownership.  
New rolls were needed to determine who should receive allotments of land. 
Sturm states that after initial resistance to allotment, the governments of the 
Five Tribes gave in and the Commission’s agents “began taking oral and 
written testimony from applicants for tribal enrollment”: 
 
The final rolls of the Five Tribes were to list newborns, minors, 
and adults in three racial categories—freedmen, intermarried 
whites, and Indians by blood, with only the latter specifying an 
Indian blood quantum.  Sensing an opportunity to reverse the 
inroads the freedmen were making in the courts, the Cherokee 
Nation attempted to frustrate the enrollment of the freedmen, 
who may have been citizens by law but were not accepted in the 
minds of the majority.81 
A set number of acres per allottee, multiplied by the number of eligible 
allottees as determined by the Dawes Rolls, subtracted from the tribe’s land 
base, invariably yielded unallotted acres of tribal land.  Under the Dawes 
Act, however, this “excess land” was not held in trust for the tribes; instead, 
it was opened to non-Indian settlement.82 
When the Dawes Commission completed its work in 1907, and 
prepared to parcel out allotments of land to Indians by blood, intermarried 
whites, and Freedmen or their descendents, the final rolls of the Cherokee 
Nation as approved by the Secretary of the Interior “contained the names of 
41,798 citizens of whom 8,698 were [Cherokee] full-bloods.  There were 
31,400 Cherokees by blood, 197 registered Delaware-Cherokees, 286 
intermarried whites, 4,991 Cherokee minors, 4,305 freedmen, and 619 
Cherokee freedmen minors.”83 
Because the Cherokee Nation today requires that prospective tribal 
citizens establish an ancestor on the Dawes Rolls, the Dawes Rolls have 
exclusive authority over the legal definition of who is a Cherokee.84 
80 STURM, supra note 58, at 79. 
81 Id. at 173.  
82 ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN: THE BETRAYAL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED 
TRIBES 23 (1940). 
83 WARDELL, supra note 68, at 333. 
84 The Cherokee Nation’s citizenship eligibility process provides: “To be eligible for 
CDIB/Tribal Citizenship with the Cherokee Nation, you must be able to provide documents 
that connect you to an enrolled lineal ancestor, who is listed on the (DAWES ROLL) 
FINAL ROLLS OF CITIZENS AND FREEDMEN OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES, 
Cherokee Nation. This roll was taken between 1899-1906 of Citizens and Freedmen 
residing in Indian Territory (now NE Oklahoma). Many applicants do not qualify for 
CDIB/Citizenship as their ancestors did not meet the enrollment requirements and were not 
enrolled. Certain requirements had to be met in order to be placed on the Dawes Roll.” 
Cherokee Nation Registration Office, www.cherokee.org (follow “Services” hyperlink; 
then follow “Registration” hyperlink”) (last visited August 16, 2006). “CDIB” refers to a 
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Throughout the twentieth century persons claiming to be descendents of 
former Cherokee slaves whose ancestors appear on the Kern-Clifton Roll or 
the Wallace Roll but not on the Dawes Rolls have fought in court to 
overturn this exclusive authority and be recognized as tribal citizens 
according to some other legal rubric. Their efforts have been consistently 
unsuccessful.85 
During the early years of the “dormition” of the Cherokee Nation,86 the 
Freedmen and their descendents, along with Cherokee Indians by “blood” 
and the rest of the Five Tribes, suffered the depredations of unscrupulous 
land-grabbers who defrauded the new allottees at every opportunity.  So 
successful were these “grafters” that “by 1930 the Five-Tribes Indians 
owned less than 2 million acres of land, down from a total of 19,525,966 
acres in 1890.”87 In addition, Oklahoma during the early decades of the 
twentieth century was marked by collective violence against African 
Americans. Race riots occurred in several locations,88 including the 
infamous Tulsa Riot of 1921, which took the lives of between 100 and 300 
black residents and charred an estimated 1256 homes and virtually all 
schools, churches, businesses, a library and a hospital in Tulsa’s black 
neighborhood of Greenwood. Between 1907 and 1920, 33 black persons 
were lynched in Oklahoma.  During the 1920s, the Ku Klux Klan in 
Oklahoma boasted tens of thousands of members.89 Notwithstanding these 
horrific circumstances, the Freedmen and their descendents who were 
 
Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood, issued by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to establish 
the holder’s Indian blood quantum based on information in the Dawes Rolls.  The effect of 
requiring a CDIB in addition to showing an ancestor on the Dawes Rolls was to preclude 
non-Indians from registering as tribal members. See discussion infra notes 92-94 and 
accompanying text.  After the Lucy Allen decision, the Nation created a separate 
registration procedure that does not require Freedmen’s descendents to produce a CDIB but 
still requires them to demonstrate their descent from an enrollee on the Freedmen’s Roll of 
the Dawes Rolls.  See 
http://www.cherokee.org/docs/registration/Freedman_Registration.pdf (last visited August 
16, 2006). 
85 See Cherokee Nation and United States v. Whitmire, 223 U.S. 108, 117 (1912) 
(upholding the legitimacy of the Dawes Rolls over the Kern-Clifton Roll “as an authentic 
identification of the individual freedmen”). For an overview of the legal history of the 
Freedmen’s descendents in the twentieth century, see STURM, supra note 58, at 173-78. 
86 From the Curtis Act of 1898 to President Nixon’s renunciation of termination in 
1970 and Cherokee tribal elections in 1971. See discussion supra notes 44, 49-51, 78 and 
accompanying text. 
87 STURM, supra note 58, at 174 (citations omitted).  See esp. the classic history of the 
massive defrauding of the Dawes allotment recipients, DEBO, STILL THE WATERS RUN,
supra note 82, esp. 92-125 (“The Grafters’ Share”).  
88 STURM, supra note 58 at 174. 
89 Final Report of the Oklahoma Commission to Study the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 
(2001), http://www.tulsareparations.org/FinalReport.htm (last visited August 16, 2006). On 
the history of lynching as a failure to secure equal protection under the law for African 
Americans, and racially motivated violence under Jim Crow, see RANDALL KENNEDY,
RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 41-63 (1997). 
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included on the Dawes Rolls prospered as citizens of the Cherokee 
Nation.90 According to Sturm: 
 
Despite increased violence during the first three decades of the 
twentieth century, new freedmen citizens on the whole fared 
better than they had in the antebellum Cherokee Nation.  Ever 
since allotment, they had increased civil rights and were able to 
get access to the Cherokee courts, sit on juries, serve as elected 
officials, have some security in their improvements, and enjoy 
limited school facilities.91 
The Cherokee Freedmen’s participation in the tribal elections in 
1971—the first tribal election for the office of principal chief since before 
the Curtis Act—and the subsequent tribal elections of 1975 may be a high-
water mark in the Freedmen’s civic participation in the life of the Nation. 
For by the time of the election of 1983, the Nation’s leadership had 
amended the tribal code to require voters to hold a Certificate of Degree of 
Indian Blood, or “CDIB,” issued by the federal government. In an 
unpublished interview, former Principal Chief Ross Swimmer (who served 
from 1975 to 1985) stated, according to Sturm, that: 
 
[F]ive years earlier in 1977-78 both the voter registration 
committee and the tribal membership committee registration 
committee had established new rules. These rules declared that 
according to the new Cherokee Constitution of 1976, an 
individual must have a certificate degree of Indian blood (CDIB) 
to be registered as a tribal citizen or voter.92 
90 The complex realities of social prosperity and racial threat experienced in the black 
towns of early Oklahoma is discussed in Phyllis E. Bernard, Oklahoma: The New Africa, 
26 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 901 (2001). See also Peter Wallenstein, Native Americans Are 
White, African Americans Are Not: Racial Identity, Marriage, Inheritance, and the Law in 
Oklahoma, 1907-1967, 39 JOURNAL OF THE WEST 55-63, 56 (2000) (“Oklahoma law 
defined as nonwhite only residents who had African ancestry. . . . [W]hile whites came to 
dominate, Indians moved into middle position.”). Oklahoma laws prohibited interracial 
marriage between blacks and whites until they were struck down consistent with Loving in 
1967.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
91 STURM, supra note 58, at 174. 
92 Id. at 178.  Because elections are held every four years, the change in voter 
eligibility in 1977-78 means the Freedmen’s descendents would only have been permitted 
to vote in the 1971 and 1975 elections. In part because the Freedmen were not permitted to 
vote in the 2003 referendum on the 1999 Constitution, the BIA refused to approve the 
document. However, the 1999 Constitution removed the textual provision of the 1975 
Constitution calling for federal approval of constitutional changes, and on June 7, 2006, the 
JAT ruled in a 2-1 decision that due to the tribe’s inherent sovereignty the new Constitution 
received all necessary approvals when it was passed by the voters. See JAT Rules 2003 
Constitution Law, Cherokee Phoenix and Indian Advocate, June 2006, www.cherokee.org
(follow “Phoenix” hyperlink; then follow “Archives” hyperlink”) (last visited August 16, 
2006); Comparison of the 1976 and 1999 Constitutions, 
http://www.cherokee.org/TribalGovernment/Executive/CCC/ccc1999Changes.pdf (last 
visited August 16, 2006). The exclusion of the Freedmen from the 2003 referendum 
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The introduction of this requirement—possession of a federally-issued 
CDIB—into the formal criteria for Cherokee Nation citizenship in 1977-78 
marked the first time since the Treaty of 1866 that the Nation had officially 
predicated citizenship on biology: proof of “Indian blood” was now 
required for tribal citizenship.93 The Dawes Rolls were effectively 
attenuated to “Indian blood”-based categories only, and in subsequent 
elections, Freedmen’s descendents were turned back from the polls.94 
3. The Limits of Legal Definitions of Citizenship 
 
The history of the Cherokee Freedmen presented above only begins to 
touch on the complex relationship between the Cherokee Nation in 
reconstruction and a victorious United States. It does not do justice to the 
Nation’s fight against the insatiable demands of white settlers for 
“unoccupied” Cherokee land in Indian Territory, the consequent loss of 
much of the tribal land base through allotment and fraud, and the harsh 
impact of decades-long government policies, both federal and state, aimed 
at cultural assimilation and elimination of tribal sovereignty. The revival of 
the Cherokee Nation in the early 1970s should be understood as the political 
reawakening of a proud indigenous community. As former Principal Chief 
Wilma Mankiller (1985-95) has said of this period, “The tribal power base 
was dominated by men, but it was refreshing to see that at least a rebirth of 
our government, which the federal government had tried to suppress for 
seventy years, was in full swing.”95 Yet the history sketched above reveals 
limitations on the capability of legal definitions to provide a coherent 
Cherokee identity today for all of the Nation’s citizens. 
 When the Freedmen were adopted into the Nation by the Treaty of 
1866, they enjoyed in theory all the legal benefits of citizenship. Indeed, the 
Nation’s amendment of its Constitution that year indicates the tribe’s intent 
to confer those benefits on its former slaves and their descendents.  
However, no sooner were economic resources available than the tribe began 
to protest the inclusion of the Freedmen in their distribution, discriminating 
between political rights as citizens (which the tribe readily acknowledged 
belonged to the Freedmen) and economic rights that pertained only to 
“native Cherokees.” Time and again in the late 1800s, Congress and courts 
were called upon to enforce the economic rights of Freedmen and other 
“adopted” Cherokees.  When confronted with the terms of the Treaty of 
1866, the tribe countered that the Treaty was forced upon it, so its 
 
sparked a lawsuit by Freedmen’s descendents, including Marilyn Vann, against the United 
States (the Cherokee Nation intervened) which remains pending. Complaint, Vann v. 
Norton (D.D.C.), August 11, 2003, http://www.freedmen5tribes.com/Lawsuit.htm (last 
visited August 16, 2006). 
93 The racial and biological underpinnings of the Dawes Rolls themselves are analyzed 
infra notes 208-232 and accompanying text. 
94 See supra notes 58, 92 and accompanying text. 
95 WILMA MANKILLER & MICHAEL WALLIS, MANKILLER: A CHIEF AND HER PEOPLE 
217 (1993). 
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obligation to adopt the Freedmen and grant citizenship to them and their 
descendents should not be binding;96 an assertion the Lucy Allen majority 
considered and dismissed.97 The resistance of tribal leadership to 
recognizing the Cherokees’ former slaves and their descendents as 
Cherokee citizens meant that roll after roll of Freedmen was drawn up to 
ascertain eligible beneficiaries of financial distributions and allotments. 
Though legally on the same footing as “native Cherokees,” both before and 
after the Dawes Rolls, the Freedmen were never recognized by the tribe as 
“real” Cherokees.   
 When the Nation officially reasserted itself in the early 1970s it quickly 
took steps to legally exclude an already marginalized social group, the 
Freedmen’s descendents, by amending the tribal code to require Dawes 
Rolls-based proof of Indian “blood quantum” (the CDIB requirement). The 
Nation no longer admitted, as its counsel did before the Court of Claims in 
Whitmire, that the right of the Freedmen and their descendents to vote or 
enjoy other political rights of citizenship “has never been questioned or 
abridged in the slightest.”98 Freedmen’s descendents who protested their 
exclusion have reportedly been told that “Freedmen were compensated with 
allotments, unlike freed slaves in the South after the American Civil War,”99 
as though they had bargained away their citizenship for land, or “Freedmen 
did not help during the last 100 hundred [sic] years to rebuild the Cherokee 
Nation and should not at this late date reap any benefits that Cherokees have 
earned,”100 ignoring the counterpoints that either the Freedmen’s help in 
 
96 The Lucy Allen dissent asserted that “the majority opinion fails to point out that the 
Treaty of 1866 and the 1866 amendment to the 1839 Constitution of the Cherokee Nation 
was a direct result of the [fact that the] 1866 Treaty was brought about by duress from the 
United States Federal Government after the Cherokee Nation chose the losing side of the 
Civil War. . . . My colleagues in the majority opinion have failed to cite any instance where 
the Cherokee Nation voluntarily granted citizenship to the Cherokee Freedmen prior to or 
after 1866.” Lucy Allen, at 29 (Darrell R. Matlock, Jr., C.J., dissenting). See also the 
comments of former Cherokee Nation Deputy Chief Ketcher, supra note 33-35 and 
accompanying text. 
97 The majority stated that “[a]lthough this treaty was signed at the end of the Civil 
War, when the Cherokee Nation was in a weaker bargaining position, it is nonetheless an 
agreement between two sovereign nations.  When the Cherokee Nation enters into treaties 
with other nations, we expect the other sovereign to live up to the promises they make.  It is 
rightly expected that we will also keep the promises we make.”  Lucy Allen, at 18. The 
Court also reminded the Nation that “[t]he fact that internal Cherokee laws were amended 
to acknowledge the Cherokee Nation’s compliance with the 1866 Treaty should not be 
ignored.”  Id. at 19.  Elsewhere, however, the majority seems to draw back from its flat 
conclusion that the Nation should “keep the promises we make,” and questions “whether 
the Cherokee Nation, like other sovereigns, has the internal power to unilaterally abrogate 
treaties.” Id. at 20. The majority adds in dicta that “[t]his Court sees no reason why the 
Cherokee Nation must be bound by a treaty until the end of time, particularly when that 
treaty has been broken by the other sovereign,” but cautions that abrogation of any treaty 
must be done “by clear actions which are consistent with the Cherokee Nation 
Constitution,” not by “mere implication.”  Id. 
98 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
99 Freedmen Statement, supra note 17. 
100 Id. 
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rebuilding the Nation was seldom welcomed, or Freedmen did in fact help 
rebuild the Nation.101 
From the above it is clear that the legal definition of Cherokee identity 
since 1866 has failed to produce legitimized Cherokee social identities for 
all citizens of the Nation.102 Although the legal definition of Cherokees, as 
provided for by the Treaty of 1866 and the constitutional amendments of 
1866, granted “native Cherokees,” Freedmen, and other adoptees 
citizenship in one and the same polity, neither then nor since have 
Cherokees by “blood” and Freedmen shared the same Cherokee social 
identity or even compatible Cherokee social identities. My brief review of 
the history of the Cherokee Nation since reconstruction indicates that each 
time major financial or political opportunities have arisen, “native 
Cherokees” have striven to distinguish themselves as a social subset of the 
common citizenry and accrue to themselves control of these opportunities to 
realize their vision of the Nation.  
 With the proposed amendment to the Cherokee Constitution to impose 
an “Indian blood” requirement, the Cherokee Nation may be heading at last 
toward an isomorphism of one set of its members’ social identities (as 
biological Cherokees) and their political identity (as Cherokee citizens).  
The Freedmen’s descendents would be hived off and rendered invisible 
from the standpoint of the Nation’s organic document and tribal code. But 
the resolution of the political crisis by legal simplification could come at a 
significant social cost, not least because the public debate thus far has 
avoided or disavowed the role of perhaps the most important variable of all: 
race. 
 
C. Cherokee Identity: Biological Definitions and their Limits 
 
The Lucy Allen Court, in rejecting the validity of the tribal code’s 
“Indian blood”-based citizenship criteria, distinguished the Nation as a 
political sovereign from the tribe as a biologically-linked community, and in 
so doing, pointed to the rich and complex network of races and societies 
that have traditionally made up the Cherokee Nation’s polity: 
 
The Cherokee nation is a Sovereign.  The Cherokee Nation is 
much more than just a group of families with a common 
 
101 See, e.g., the example of Freedman’s descendent Leslie Ross whose grandfather 
Stick Ross served on the Council (the “lower” half of the Cherokee legislature, the “upper” 
half being the Senate), supra note 21. The roster of Cherokee Council members in the late 
nineteenth century includes six who are designated as “negro” in Emmet Starr’s 
authoritative history: Joseph Brown (1875), Stick Ross (1895), Ned Irons (1895) (all from 
Tahlequah District); Frank Vann (1887), Samuel Stidham (1895) (both from Illinois 
District); Jerry Alberty (1889) (Cooweescoowee District). EMMETT STARR, HISTORY OF 
THE CHEROKEE INDIANS AND THEIR LEGENDS AND FOLKLORE 277-83 (1921; reprinted 
2003). 
102 See STURM, supra note 58, at 105 (“Cherokee blood policies constitute the 
Cherokee Nation in a legal and political sense but . . . these legal definitions do not 
correspond with sociocultural realities at the local level.”). 
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ancestry.  For almost 150 years, the Cherokee Nation has 
included not only citizens that are Cherokee by blood, but also 
citizens who have origins in other Indian nations and/or African 
and/or European ancestry.  Many of these citizens are mixed 
race and a small minority of these citizens possess no Cherokee 
blood at all.103 
I advert to the Cherokee Nation’s traditionally varied racial and ethnic 
composition not to argue that tribal policies should reflect the past, and 
therefore efforts to amend the Constitution to impose a “blood” requirement 
for citizenship are inappropriate.  As a citizen of the Cherokee Nation 
myself, whose citizenship will not be affected by the proposed amendment, 
I agree with legal scholar Carole Goldberg that the “contemporary concerns 
of tribal communities” must be the touchstone for setting citizenship 
criteria, and “there is no reason to deny” the legitimacy of criteria based on 
such concerns “merely because they depart from ‘traditional’ measures.”104 
At the same time, clearing the field of methodological attachments to 
traditions of citizenship begs the question for the Cherokee Nation’s 
voters—and for no one else—of how we should evaluate biology as a 
criterion for citizenship, especially where our tribal history includes slave-
holding and our northeastern Oklahoma roots are still fed in significant 
ways by the culture of the South.105 
1. The Construction of the “Red” Race 
 
“Race,” Circe Sturm writes, “is not a natural, biological, or scientific 
category.  Instead, it is a social, historical, and political category defined in 
biological terms.”106 In his important study of the construction of whiteness 
as a prerequisite for United States citizenship, legal scholar Ian Haney 
Lopez defines “race” as “the historically contingent social systems of 
meaning that attach to elements of morphology and ancestry.” 107 Lopez 
 
103 Lucy Allen, at 9.  The Court continued: “People will always disagree on who is 
culturally Cherokee and who possess enough Cherokee blood to be ‘racially’ Indian.  It is 
not the role of this Court to engage in these political or social debates.”  Id. at 10. 
104 Carole Goldberg, Members Only? Designing Citizenship Requirements for Indian 
Nations, 50 KAN. L. REV. 437, 438 (2002). 
105 See STURM, supra note 58, at 14 (“Most Cherokees consider Oklahoma their home 
in the fullest sense of the word, but almost all look back to the South, to their aboriginal 
homeland. . . . Many never get a chance to go back, but those geographic, historical, and 
cultural origins continually visit their imaginations and shape their identities in complex 
ways.”). 
106 Id. at 14-15. 
107 IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 14 
(1996). See also Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993) 
(on evolution of whiteness as a form of racial identity to a form of property and status) and 
Rebecca Tsosie, The New Challenge to Native Identity: An Essay on “Indigeneity” and 
“Whiteness,” 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55 (2005) (arguing for expansion of dialogue on 
whiteness to colonialism and its global power over indigenous peoples’ resources). 
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elaborates his understanding of race along three “interrelated levels, the 
physical, the social, and the material’: 
 
First, race turns on physical features and lines of descent, not 
because features or lineage themselves are a function of racial 
variation, but because society has invested these with racial 
meanings.  Second, because the meanings given to certain 
features and ancestries denote race, it is the social processes of 
ascribing racialized meanings to faces and forbearers that lie at 
the heart of racial fabrication. Third, these meaning-systems, 
while originally only ideas, gain force as they are reproduced in 
the material conditions of society.  The distribution of wealth 
and poverty turns in part on the actions of social and legal actors 
who have accepted ideas of race, with the resulting material 
conditions becoming part of and reinforcement for the 
contingent meanings understood as race.108 
The relationship of law to race is not merely regulatory, it is productive. On 
all three levels—physical, social, and material—law operates to assign 
meaning to bodies and ancestry.  As Lopez states, “The legal system 
influences what we look like, the meanings ascribed to our looks, and the 
material reality that confirms the meanings of our appearances.  Law 
constructs race.”109 
The construction of racial identities through the dividing practices of 
plantation slave-holding and resistance to it established patterns of social 
interaction that would reproduce themselves long after 1866 and the end of 
slavery itself. My focus in this section and the next will be on the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, when Cherokees developed their own forms of 
colonial and early-American slave-holding inflected by traditional Cherokee 
culture and Euroamerican notions of citizenship.110 In the process, 
Cherokees reproduced and politically imbedded the practices by which 
racialized meanings were assigned to the faces and forbearers of African-
descended men and women, Euroamericans, and themselves. 
 The construction of Cherokees as “red men” was not a self-reflexive act 
of an indigenous people, but was performed by Europeans and 
Euroamericans according to preexisting racial narratives, drawn from 
Christian monogenetic and Enlightenment sources, which esteemed 
whiteness, loathed blackness, and sought the salvation and civilization of 
all.111 In 1728, for example, Virginia planter William Byrd wrote, “All 
 
108 LOPEZ, supra note 107, at 14. 
109 Id. at 19. 
110 The early history of the social construction of African-Native American peoples is 
documented in JACK D. FORBES, AFRICANS AND NATIVE AMERICANS: THE LANGUAGE OF 
RACE AD THE EVOLUTION OF RED-BLACK PEOPLES (1993).  See also WILLIAM LOREN 
KATZ, BLACK INDIANS: A HIDDEN HERITAGE (1986) (social and political history of the 
topic).  
111 Scholar of ethnicity and African American studies Tiya Miles has written, “[The] 
system of White supremacy was nourished by an ideology of White supremacy that 
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Nations of men have the same Natural Dignity, and we all know that very 
bright Talents may be lodg’d under a very dark Skin.  The principal 
Difference between one People and another proceeds only from the 
different Opportunities of Improvement.”112 By the end of the 18th century, 
however, “Cherokees had begun to internalize some ideas of race as 
fundamental to their own identity.” 113 They had incorporated “an 
understanding of racial difference and racial prejudice that articulated with 
Western views. . . . [H]uman differences that Cherokees had once 
understood in terms of color symbolism, culture, politics, and kinship were 
now also understood in terms of race”: 
 
Red, white, and black had become racial categories “because the 
Cherokees described the origins of difference as innate, the 
product of separate creations, and they spoke of skin color as if it 
were a meaningful index of difference.”114 
Indeed, skin color was a meaningful index of difference: Cherokees of 
the late 18th century were engaged in “racial fabrication” by ascribing social 
meaning to their own “faces and forbearers” (Lopez) and the physiognomy 
and lineage of those around them. On some occasions, Cherokees attempted 
to simultaneously accept their classification as “red” and subvert the 
Euroamerican hierarchy of white over red by appealing to shared norms of 
theology and longevity on the land.  For example, presiding over the Treaty 
of Hopewell in 1785, Cherokee chief Old Tassel reminded his American 
interlocutors, “I am made of this earth, on which the great man above 
placed me, to possess it. . . . You must know the red people are the 
aborigines of this land, and that it is but a few years since the white people 
found it out. I am of the first stock, as the commissioners know, and a 
native of this land; and the white people are now living on it as our 
friends.”115 
At the same time, with the support of American policies of 
“civilization,” Cherokees were increasingly intermarrying with 
 
pervaded the rhetoric and writing of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English.  
Historian Winthrop Jordan [argues] that the English saw Africans as ‘black,’ a description 
that, for them, connoted evil, bestiality, and filth.” Tiya Miles, Uncle Tom Was an Indian: 
Tracing the Red in Black Slavery, in CONFOUNDING THE COLOR LINE: THE INDIAN-BLACK 
EXPERIENCE IN NORTH AMERICA 137-60, 141-42 (James F. Brooks, ed. 2002); citing 
WINTHROP JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF RACISM IN THE 
UNITED STATES 48 (1974). On monogenesis as a theological construct, see STURM, supra 
note 58, at 44. 
112 THEDA PERDUE, “MIXED BLOOD” INDIANS: RACIAL CONSTRUCTION IN THE EARLY 
SOUTH 71 (2003); quoting WILLIAM BYRD, WILLIAM BYRD’S HISTORIES OF THE DIVIDING 
LINE BETWIXT VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA 120 (William K. Boyd ed., 1929; reprint, 
New York: Dover Publications, 1967).  
113 STURM, supra note 58, at 47. 
114 Id. at 50; quoting Nancy Shoemaker, How Indians Got to Be Red, 102 AMERICAN 
HISTORICAL REVIEW 625, 643 (1997). 
115 STURM, supra note 58, at 48; quoting Old Tassel, in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS,
CLASS 2: INDIAN AFFAIRS 41 (1832). 
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Euroamericans.  Indeed, the socially-approved practice of intermarriage 
between Euroamerican men and Native American women was of 
longstanding. For nearly two centuries, Euroamerican officials and 
missionaries held up the example of the Virginian John Rolfe, who married 
Pocahontas, the daughter of Algonquian chief, Powhatan, in 1614, as proof 
of the advantages that could accrue to both Euroamericans (in terms of 
peace and economic gain) and Native Americans (in terms of cultural and 
religious “betterment”) if they “blended their stocks” in marriage.116 So 
beneficial were these unions regarded for British colonial interests that 
government officials in 1755 urged a policy of relocating Euroamerican 
soldiers and convicts to the frontier to serve as marriage partners for Native 
American women.117 Similarly, early United States policy endorsed by 
Thomas Jefferson, among others, favored intermarriage between settlers and 
Native Americans as a means assimilating the latter to the “civilized” 
culture and mores of the former.118 The phenomenon of Euro- and Native 
American intermarriage may be attributed in part to the view prevalent 
through the 18th century that “red” skin resulted from environmental causes 
and did not reflect fundamental differences between the two groups: the 
Indians’ application of “bear’s oil, or grease, mixt with a certain red root, 
which, by a peculiar property, is able alone, in a few years time, to produce 
the Indian colour in those white born.”119 “Europeans,” historian Theda 
Perdue states, “refused to admit that Indians possessed genetically darker 
skin.”120 
The accommodation, indeed cultivation, of Indian-white intermarriage 
of this period illustrates Lopez’s point that race is physically constructed by 
laws and policies that constrain or facilitate reproductive choices: 
 
While admittedly laws cannot alter biology governing human 
morphology, rule-makers can and have altered human behavior 
 
116 PERDUE, “MIXED BLOOD,” supra note 112, at 72-73.  As William Byrd expressed 
the point, “A sprightly Lover is the most prevailing Missionary.” Id. at 75. Before marrying 
Rolfe, Pocahontas converted to Christianity and changed her name to Rebecca, then 
followed her husband to England, where she lived the life of a Jacobean lady until her 
death. She is buried in England.  Perdue states that “her son and his descendents ethnically 
identified as white even as they boasted descent from Pocahontas.”  Id. at 73.  See a 
contemporary portrait of Pocahontas-Rebecca, Jacobean lady, and an account of her life, 
http://www.apva.org/history/pocahont.html (last visited August 16, 2006). 
117 In 1755, Edmund Aikin, in a report on colonial Indian affairs, urged the 
intermarriage of soldiers stationed on the frontier with Indian women “by which means our 
Interest among the Indians will be strengthened.”  Akins also recommended that “able 
bodied men Convicts of petty crimes, instead of being hanged, or incorporated among the 
People of our Colonies” be sent to the frontier to marry Indian women and “strengthen the 
peace.”  PERDUE, “MIXED BLOOD,” supra note 112, at 73. 
118 Id. at 73-74. Thomas Jefferson favored intermarriage of Indian women and white 
men to promote civilization, as did his Indian agents for the Creek and the Cherokee, 
Benjamin Hawkins and Return Meigs, respectively. See id. at 74-76.  
119 PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 47. 
120 Id. at 46. 
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that produces variations in physical appearance. In other words, 
laws have directly shaped reproductive choices.121 
An example of such law-shaped variations is the phenomenon of 
“mixed bloods.” As a result of government-encouraged Indian-white 
intermarriage, and later the Cherokee’s own legal codes permitting white-
Cherokee unions,122 generations of Cherokee children were racially 
constructed as “mixed-bloods.” Purdue writes that, “Unlike their white 
neighbors, Native people had no category for ‘mixed-bloods’ and almost 
never used the term. On the rare occasion when they did, ‘half-breed’ 
described or personified departures from traditional ways of doing things 
rather than identifying particular individuals by race.”123 For Euroamericans 
of the early 19th century, however, mixed-bloods could be unsettling, 
liminal beings, confusing at times in their appearance,124 constantly in need 
of authoritative surveillance125 and racial coding.126 At the same time, 
“mixed-blood” Cherokees who were familiar with Euroamerican culture 
could be especially effective in negotiating the interests of the Nation. The 
“mixed-blood” Cherokee principal chief John Ross, “[a]lthough only 1/8 
Cherokee . . . was reared traditionally and had a preference for native 
clothing and mode of dressing as a boy and young man. He was educated in 
mission schools and at private boarding schools.”127 Ross was highly 
acculturated as a Cherokee, and moved easily between cultures during 
 
121 LOPEZ, supra note 107, at 14-15. 
122 “As citizens of a new multiracial nation, Cherokees were willing to accept 
intermarriages between themselves and whites but not with African-American slaves.” 
STURM, supra note 58, at 54. 
123 PERDUE, “MIXED BLOOD,” supra note 112, at 90.  The only group of “mixed-
bloods,” according to Perdue, which Native people treated distinctively was children born 
to “Indian men and white women who had not been adopted into clans.”  Id. at 94.  Under 
the matrilineal rules of many tribes, including the Cherokee, children of Native American 
mothers are automatically members of their mother’s clan, regardless of their paternity.  
Children of Native American fathers and non-Native mothers, therefore, must be adopted 
into clans to receive Native American familial status. 
124 In the case of mixed-blood Indian-white children, color was often a poor proxy for 
race. Perdue reports that “outsiders” often had difficulty “distinguishing ‘full-bloods’ and 
‘mixed-bloods,’” adding, “the eccentricity of genes created a ‘diversity of complexion’ that 
made skin tone an . . . imperfect determinant of ancestry.”  Id. at 91.  On “mixed-blood” 
Indians in American literature, see HARRY J. BROWN, INJUN JOE’S GHOST: THE INDIAN 
MIXED-BLOOD IN AMERICAN WRITING (2004). 
125 Missionaries identified school children according to ancestry, on church rolls 
headed “pedigree,” and carefully noted their blood as “full” or “mixed blood.”  See 
PERDUE, “MIXED BLOOD,” supra note 112, at 88. 
126 See the anecdotes id. at 75 (missionaries in 1822 praise mixed-bloods “instructed in 
letters and religion . . . christianized and civilized” while criticizing white children “totally 
ignorant of letters and of religion”); 91 (missionaries in 1824 express perplexity that “some 
of the full Indians are so light, that, if protected from the weather as much of the people as 
our own country, they would not differ many shades from a dark Englishman.”). 
127 Cherokee Nation, John Ross, www.cherokee.org (follow “Culture” hyperlink; then 
follow “History” hyperlink”; then follow “Chiefs” hyperlink) (last visited August 16, 
2006). 
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successive national crises during his nearly forty-year tenure as principal 
chief, from 1828 to his death in 1886.128 
In summary, as the 19th century began, Cherokees had adopted two, 
complementary race-based strategies for dealing with the new Republic and 
the insatiable demands of Euroamerican settlers for tribal lands. On the one 
hand, Cherokees appear to have accepted their racial construction as “red,” 
but resisted, even inverted, the Euroamerican hierarchy of races that 
subordinated red to white.  On the other hand, Cherokees increasingly took 
on the customs, dress, manners and appearance of Euroamericans, and 
through intermarriage with them, “coded” increasingly as white. These 
Cherokees, many though not all of them of “mixed-blood,” ascended to 
leadership positions in the tribe, and, with “full-bloods,” endeavored to 
negotiate their traditional Cherokee self-understanding as “the principal 
people”129 by participating in the vernacular of Euroamerican culture and 
the institutions of the Southern colonies, later states.130 Consequently, the 
road to Cherokee prosperity for some would lead through the political 
institution of the nation-state, and the economic engine of plantation 
slavery. 
 
2. The Construction of “Black” by “Red” 
 
Lopez reminds us that the specification of faces and forbearers in terms 
of race relies upon social meaning-systems which, “while originally only 
ideas, gain force as they are reproduced in the material conditions of 
society.”131 Cherokees, who adopted and strategically adapted 
 
128 Id. Known in Cherokee as Koo-wi-s-gu-wi, Ross is widely considered the greatest 
of the Cherokee chiefs for his leadership of the Nation during the trauma of Removal and 
the Civil War.  Ross’s ancestry was seven-eighths Scottish and one-eighth Cherokee. 
WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, AFTER THE TRAIL OF TEARS: THE CHEROKEES’ STRUGGLE FOR 
SOVERIGNTY, 1839-1880 3 (1993).  Nonetheless, Ross was widely respected among 
culturally conservative Cherokees for his resistance to Removal: “though only an eighth-
blood, [he] was inwardly all Cherokee.”  GRACE STEELE WOODWARD, THE CHEROKEES 
132 (1963). 
129 “The proper name by which the Cherokees call themselves [is Ani-Yun-Wiya], 
signifying ‘real people’ or ‘principal people.’. . .The word properly denotes ‘Indians,’ as 
distinguished from people of other races, but in usage it is restricted to mean members of 
the Cherokee tribe.” JAMES MOONEY, HISTORY, MYTHS, AND SACRED FORMULAS OF THE 
CHEROKEES 15 (1900; 1992).  
130 Historians McLoughlin and Conser caution, however, that “[o]ne must avoid the 
easy conclusion that the wealthy, mixed-blood elite was necessarily the ruling body or 
oligarchy of the Cherokee Nation at this time [ca. 1835].” William G. McLoughlin & 
Walter H. Conser, Jr., The Cherokees in Transition: A Statistical Analysis of the Federal 
Cherokee Census of 1835, 64 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN HISTORY 678-703, 698 (1977). 
As checks on any potential oligarchy, the Cherokee government functioned through a 
bicameral legislature, where “by tradition and design, the Cherokees consistently gave the 
well-to-do a larger role in the upperhouse while retaining popular control of the 
lowerhouse,” and, in addition, the Cherokee followed their tradition “that all decisions 
affecting the general welfare of the tribe or nation should be taken only after long debate 
had produced a consensus.” Id. 
131 LOPEZ, supra note 107, at 14. 
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Euroamerican notions of race and “redness” in the 17th and 18th centuries, 
appear to have easily embraced Euroamerican bias against black skin when 
they encountered it in the bodies of African slaves, and to have interpreted 
it immediately as a sign of intrinsically inferior social status.132 While 
Cherokees initially had no concept of race,133 “[s]oon after their first contact 
with Africans . . . the Cherokees no doubt realized that Europeans regarded 
blacks as inferiors and they were in danger of receiving the same 
treatment.”134 Indeed, “[t]he English colonists purchased their first cargo of 
Africans at about the same time they began enslaving Indians.”135 
The enslavement of Native Americans peaked during 1715-1717 and 
declined until it officially ended after the American Revolution.136 While 
the Indian slave-trade flourished, the powerful Cherokees, while sometimes 
victims of capture and sale, turned away from their aboriginal system of 
warfare (which operated in the service of clan-based retributive justice)137 
and became adept market participants in the capture and trading of Indians 
of neighboring tribes, such as the Yuchi and Guale, to Europeans.  As a 
result, traditional Cherokee society, which operated economically on 
subsistence farming and hunting, changed forever, as Cherokees became 
increasingly dependent on the Western market goods they received in 
exchange for captive Indians.138 
As the market for Indian slaves declined, Cherokees shifted to 
capturing and trading black slaves, having “discovered that the capture of 
black slaves was particularly profitable, and by the American Revolution 
most Cherokees traded almost exclusively in black slaves.”139 When 
African slaves ran away, their owners commonly employed Native 
Americans, including Cherokees, to retrieve their lost property.140 Fearing 
alliances between Native Americans and African slaves, the colonists “not 
only employed Indians to find escaped slaves but also used blacks in 
 
132 See William G. McLoughlin, Red Indians, Black Slavery and White Racism: 
America’s Slaveholding Indians, 26 AMERICAN QUARTERLY 367, 371 (1974) (“The first 
time that Indians ever saw black men they appeared as the slaves of Spanish, French or 
English masters.  Consequently, without any policy of divide and rule, the white man 
showed the Indian by his actions that he considered darker people inferior to white-skinned 
people.”).  
133 On the tribal and ontological status of the atsi nahsa’i, or bondsmen, owned by 
aboriginal Cherokees, and why they should not categorized as “slaves” in the modern 
sense, see PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 3-18. 
134 Id. at 36. 
135 Id. at 36-37. 
136 Id. at 37. 
137 See RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO 
COURT 10-39 (1975) (elaborating traditional Cherokee justice norms based on clan 
revenge); and id., Wolf Warriors and Turtle Kings: Native American Law Before the Blue 
Coats, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1043 (1997) (arguing traditional Cherokees were highly legalistic 
and lived under a value-based jurisprudence according to sacred norms). 
138 PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 22. 
139 Id. at 38. 
140 Id. at 39-40 (“In 1763 whites agreed to pay Indians one musket and three blankets, 
the equivalent of thirty-five deerskins, for each black slave captured and returned.”). 
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military campaigns against Indians.”141 As historian William McLoughlin 
explains, “white colonial governors, settlers, and Army commanders in the 
Carolinas in the 18th century deliberately spread scare stories of Indian 
cruelty among their slaves, armed slaves to kill Indians and paid Indians to 
capture and return runaway slaves. . . . [all as] a conscious and calculated 
part of white policy in the years when the Indians and blacks in the 
Southeast outnumbered the white settlers and could, together, have wiped 
out the whites.”142 Throughout the 18th century, “[c]onvinced that the 
European and native Americans were practically identical, whites 
simultaneously insisted that Africans were the exact opposite of Europeans 
and Indians. By emphasizing the actual, exaggerated, and imagined 
differences between Africans and Indians, whites successfully masked the 
cultural similarities of the two as well as their mutual exploitation by 
whites.”143 
Their culture now deeply committed to the economic system of the 
colonists, Cherokees readily ascribed inferior status to black skin, which 
they associated exclusively with objects of the hunt, capture, and trade with 
whites; or as agents of warfare waged against them by white masters. Their 
early participation in the Indian slave-trade had taught Cherokees to 
transform certain persons into commodities. Now, at the end of the 18th 
century, whether as goods in the marketplace or tools of the fight, black 
bodies were first and foremost instruments of labor under the exclusive 
control of another—the very definition of slaves. In contrast to slave-
objects, Cherokees were subjects who enjoyed intersubjective relations with 
whites, intermarrying with them, studying their language and culture, and 
benefiting from ideologies of philosophy, religion, and law that, for a while 
yet, classified “white men” and “red men” as brothers, if not equals, “under 
the skin.”  The monogenetic premise of a common humanity, however, 
would soon change, and “blood would tell.” 
 
3. Cherokee Slavery and Cherokee Nation 
 
Two major shifts, one socio-economic, the other political, occurred in 
the Cherokee Nation of the 19th century that bear particularly on today’s 
Freedmen controversy.  The first was the adoption of plantation slavery and 
the second was the adoption of the progressive political form of the nation. 
The two are historically related in that many of the same individuals who 
formed the economic, largely mixed-blood elite who owned significant 
landed estates were the most ardent supporters of nationhood and the 
specification of Cherokee political identity in terms of citizenship. 
Cherokees of the antebellum South contributed to the empowerment of a 
race-based economy by simultaneously exercising authority over race-
subordinates and negotiating their own identities under the conditions of 
white colonization. 
 
141 Id. at 41. 
142 McLaughlin, Red Indians, supra note 132, at 369-70. 
143 PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 47. 
34 TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY [20-Aug-06 
 
a. Race as Economics 
 
The Cherokees in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
occupied aboriginal lands located largely in northwestern Georgia and 
southeastern Tennessee.144 At an estimated 12,000-15,000 population, they 
were one of the largest tribes in the Southeastern United States.145 They 
were also the wealthiest tribe, having sold extensive tracts of their land after 
1777.146 The availability of capital, combined with a government policy 
favoring Indian “civilization” through yeoman husbandry,147 and their own 
ardent desire to acquire Western technical knowledge and equipment,148 
moved the Cherokees rapidly from an economy based on subsistence 
farming and hunting and to one based on the production of surplus 
agricultural products for market.149 In the process, many Cherokees 
abandoned traditional gender roles which assigned agricultural cultivation 
and hunting to women’s and men’s labor, respectively. With game scarce 
and warfare ended, Cherokee men turned to agriculture, and in so doing, 
alienated Cherokee women from the “real economic power” they had 
previously enjoyed.150 Once labor was re-gendered, and only then, Perdue 
argues, the door opened for Cherokee slave labor and the plantation system: 
“Only when the identification of women with agriculture had ended was the 
introduction and utilization of slave labor for cultivation by even a minority 
of Cherokees possible.”151 
144 McLaughlin, Red Indians, supra note 132, at 380. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. (“Though [the Cherokee] lost much of their original land after 1777 in various 
treaties, they generally struck shrewd bargains for it.”) On annuities to the Cherokee 
generated by sales of tribal land and rights-of-way from 1777 to 1804, see WILLIAM G. 
MCLOUGHLIN, CHEROKEE RENASCENCE IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 19, 24, 46, 77, & 91 (1986) 
(proceeds included trade goods, cash, and annuities from federal government promised in 
perpetuity). 
147 PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 53-54 (citing George Washington’s proposal 
to the Cherokees for transition to an agricultural economy, as a means of their 
“civilization”). 
148 Id. at 54 (citing report of Indian agent that “the Cherokees avidly sought the tools of 
civilization”). 
149 See McLoughlin & Conser, supra note 130, at 680 (“[By 1835] Cherokees were 
indeed far advanced in the acquisition of wealth and skills and . . . those with a high 
proportion of mixed Cherokee-white ancestry tended to have more skills and more wealth. 
It also appears that there was a definite trend toward an agrarian-capitalist social order, that 
economic classes were beginning to appear, and that communal life, the clan system, and 
the extended family were fading.”). 
150 PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 52. Traditional Cherokee gender roles which 
associate agriculture with women and hunting with men are based in tribal stories of 
origination: Selu, the first woman, was physically the source of corn, which she produced 
from her body, and Kana’ti, the first man, was the provider of game, which he stored in the 
ground and withdrew as needed. See MOONEY, supra note 129, at 242-48. 
151 PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 53. 
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Statistics from the period show that as the Cherokee population grew in the 
first 60 years of the nineteenth century the number of slaves of Cherokees, 
and slaves of Cherokees as a percentage of the Cherokee population, grew 
as well.  McLaughlin reports the following data:152 
Year Cherokee 
Population 
(rounded) 
Slaves of 
Cherokees 
(number) 
Slaves of Cherokees 
(as percent of 
Cherokee population)
1809 12,000 583 4.85% 
1825 14,000 1,277 9.12% 
1835 15,000 1,592 10.61% 
1860 17,000 4,000 23.52% 
According to the census of 1835, “slaveholders cultivated more acres 
and produced more corn than nonslaveholding Cherokees, and they owned 
most of the nascent industries in the Nation.”153 With profits from the sale 
of excess agricultural product, Cherokees invested in various enterprises, 
such as mills and ferries.154 The number of slaves owned per plantation, 
however, was not large: of the 207 slaveholders in 1835, “168, or 83 
percent, owned fewer than 10 slaves.”155 Nonetheless, in 1835, Cherokees 
were significant slave-holders compared to the other tribes of the 
southeastern United States, and after Removal, the Cherokee held more 
slaves than any other tribe in Indian Territory.156 
Significantly, ownership of black slaves was not evenly distributed 
across the Cherokee population according to race. “Mixed-bloods” owned a 
disproportionately high share of the slaves. Perdue reports that “[o]nly 17 
percent of the people living in the Cherokee Nation in 1835 had any white 
ancestors, but 78 percent of the members of families owning slaves had 
some proportion of white blood.”157 Missionaries of the time referred to 
“the half-breeds [who] have large plantations, which they cultivate by the 
aid of slaves.”158 It would misleading, however, to suggest that Cherokee 
plantation slavery at this time was exclusively the provenance of wealthy 
 
152 McLaughlin, Red Indians, supra note 132, at 380. Calculation of slaves as percent 
of Cherokee population my own. Other sources place the number of Cherokee slaves in 
1860 lower than McLaughlin. See R. HALLIBURTON, JR., RED OVER BLACK: BLACK 
SLAVERY AMONG THE CHEROKEE INDIANS 117 (1977) (slaves of Cherokees in 1860 equal 
2504); and LITTLEFIELD, supra note 6, at 9 (slaves of Cherokees in 1860 equal 2511). Even 
assuming the lowest figure (2504), slaves as a percent of the Cherokee population rose 
significantly post-Removal. I do not mean to imply that slaves were counted as part of the 
Cherokee population; they were not. However, like illegal aliens in the United States today, 
their numbers were increasing significantly as a function of the majority (Cherokee) 
population and posing correspondingly greater challenges of cultural integration and social 
“management.” 
153 PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 60. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 58. 
156 LITTLEFIELD, supra note 6, at 8. 
157 Id. 
158 PERDUE, “MIXED BLOOD,” supra note 112, at 96. 
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“white-Cherokees” where some “full-bloods” (albeit a minority)159 also 
participated in the system.160 
The emergence of “mixed-blood” Cherokees in Euroamerican society 
in the early part of the 19th century is nonetheless remarkable. In addition to 
success in the economic sphere, many “mixed-bloods” negotiated hybridic 
Cherokee identities161 through intermarriage with whites,162 conversion to 
Christianity, adoption of Western-style manners and dress, and the 
achievement of fluency in written and spoken English.163 As Perdue notes, 
“Contact with a white parent or grandparent gave these people a head start 
toward ‘civilization,’ and it influenced them to identify linguistically with 
white society.”164 Economic prosperity through the plantation economy and 
successful negotiation of Cherokee identities under the conditions of 
Euroamerican cultural colonialism, especially by “mixed-bloods,” gave the 
Cherokees their reputation at the time as “the ‘most civilized’ of all the 
Indian nations.”165 As McLoughlin and Conser observe, “The Cherokees, 
in short, were acquiring by 1835, only a generation after giving up warfare 
against advancing white expansion, a bourgeois socioeconomic 
structure.”166 
159 “Slavery did not permeate the Cherokee tribe but was concentrated in the hands of a 
few: only 7.4 percent of tribal members held slaves.  Slaveholders were concentrated in the 
more mixed-blood Cherokee communities and among the more mixed-blood families: only 
1 percent of all full-blood families owned slaves . . . . This, of course, was because more 
mixed-blood families were wealthier and engaged in plantation agriculture.”  THORNTON,
supra note 42, at 53 (analyzing data from the 1835 census). 
160 STURM, supra note 58, at 56 (“Although we can discern some correlation between 
white racial ancestry, a higher class standing, and slave ownership, there were also 
significant exceptions.”). 
161 The term “hybridities” appears in postcolonial theory and refers to those moments 
“when the scenario written by colonialism is given a performance by the native that 
estranges and undermines the colonialist script.” Benita Perry, Problems in Current 
Theories of Colonial Discourse, in THE POST-COLONIAL STUDIES READER 36, 42 (Bill 
Ashcroft et al., eds. 1995).  For examples and discussion of Cherokee hybridities in the 
nineteenth century, see S. Alan Ray, Native American Identity and the Challenge of 
Kennewick Man, 79 TEMPLE. L. REV. 89, 117-18 (2006). 
162 Perdue reports that “[w]hen the United States government embarked on its policy of 
‘civilization’ . . . many Cherokees came to view matrilineal kinship as an aspect of their 
‘savage’ existence which had to be abandoned.  Consequently Cherokees began practicing 
the European pattern of inheritance, and in 1808 the council pledged ‘to give protection to 
children as heirs to their father’s property and to the widow’s share.”  PERDUE, SLAVERY,
supra note 68, at 51.  
163 PERDUE, “MIXED BLOOD,” supra note 112, at 87. 
164 PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 60. The 1835 census shows English literacy 
positively correlated with slaveholding: Among people living in slaveholding families . . . 
39 percent could read English, while only 13 percent were proficient at reading Cherokee. 
In the case of nonslaveholding Cherokees, less than 4 percent were capable of reading 
English, and 18 percent could read Cherokee.”  Id. 
165 McLaughlin, Red Indians, supra note 132, at 379.  Sturm notes that the plantation 
economy created a class-division within the Cherokees between slaveholding “full-bloods” 
and non-slaveholding “mixed-bloods” but cautions it would be simplistic to reduce racial 
orientation to a proxy for “cultural orientation and social values (i.e., that mixed blood 
equals progressive or that full blood equals traditional).”  STURM, supra note 58, at 55-57. 
166 McLoughlin & Conser, supra note 130, at 697. 
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However, the establishment of Cherokee identities under the conditions 
of plantation slavery required Cherokee masters to reproduce and even 
intensify racial stigma. Though some scholars have concluded that 
Cherokees “probably treated their slaves much better on the average than 
did their white counterparts,”167 perhaps harkening back to a time before 
Cherokees learned to code skin-color as a sign of inferiority,168 others have 
argued that “slavery among the Cherokees was little different from that in 
the white South,”169 and “some Cherokee masters could be as cruel and 
vicious as their white counterparts.”170 
The success of plantation slavery among an elite of the Cherokees in 
the first three decades of the nineteenth century, therefore, required a 
constellation of factors, among which are: government policies favoring 
“civilization” through yeoman husbandry; an influx of capital from the sale 
of certain tribal lands; an adequate and reliable supply of productive forces 
(land, tools, agricultural knowledge, and African labor); the subordination 
of clan-based obligations to the rule of American law; the transformation of 
an economy based on hunting and subsistence farming, to one devoted to 
the production of surplus goods for sale; the transformation of gendered 
labor roles within Cherokee society; and intermarriage with whites and the 
creation of corresponding bonds of intimacy and obligation with the 
dominant society.  
 The productive organization and deployment of these social and 
economic opportunities, however, required Cherokee elites to implement 
Euroamerican racial hegemonies and a corresponding ideology of “blood” 
purity.171 The Cherokee system of plantation slavery was premised on the 
 
167 PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 98.  See also McLaughlin, Red Indians, supra 
note 132, at 381 (“It is generally argued that the Cherokees treated their slaves very 
leniently.”).  McLaughlin takes issue with this claim and asserts treatment of slaves by 
“red” and “white” masters was equally variable.  Id. 
168 “Race as we understand it now was not the determining factor in a person’s tribal 
identity or tribal membership.  Instead, lineage determined belonging.  A person who 
appeared ‘Black’ and had a Native American mother would have been defined and 
accepted as Indian.” Miles, supra note 111, at 145 (referring to early colonial-era 
matrilineal kinship systems of Southeastern tribes including the Cherokee). 
169 LITTLEFIELD, supra note 6, at 8. 
170 Carla D. Pratt, Tribes and Tribulations: Beyond Sovereign Immunity and Toward 
Reparation and Reconciliation for the Estelusti, 11 WASH. & LEE R.E.A.L. J. 61, 81 
(2005).  See also Terrion L. Williamson, The Plight of “Nappy-Headed” Indians: The Role 
of Tribal Sovereignty in the Systematic Discrimination against Black Freedmen by the 
Federal Government and Native American Tribes, 10 MICH. J. RACE & LAW 233, 240 
(2004) (“One explanation for the differential treatment of Cherokee Freedmen is the 
Cherokee Nation’s adoption of slavery in its most vicious form.”). 
171 As used in this Article, “hegemonies” refers to the “scripts” of a dominant culture 
which are uncritically accepted and enacted by that culture and by the people whom they 
oppress. Racial hegemonies, for example, might express themselves in the unreflective 
sorting of people into colors, and ranking those colors in terms of status, or assigning 
“naturally” good or bad attributes to persons in those categories.  Ideologies are based in 
hegemonies and have the form of rationalizations, explanations, or justifications of the 
status quo.  Race science and Social Darwinism in the nineteenth century would be 
examples of ideologies based in the mutually reinforcing hegemonies of white, male, 
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Cherokee construction of persons of African descent as ontologically 
“other” and inferior to both Indians and whites, and therefore, like horses 
and oxen, as appropriate entities for service in the fields and marketplaces 
of their masters.172 Cherokees had been primed to embrace slavery by their 
participation in the Indian slave market of the eighteenth century, and now, 
in the nineteenth century, the social place already created for black men and 
women to occupy became an economic space for exploitation by largely 
“mixed-blood,” white-acculturated Cherokees.173 
This picture of Cherokee social and economic arrangements in the early 
nineteenth century, however, has the quality of a negative: it demonstrates 
how a subset of white-acculturated, often “mixed-blood” Cherokees, a tribal 
elite of critical historical importance, deployed Euroamerican racial 
ideologies to enslave African Americans for profit.  Yet this picture is 
partial.  It does not reveal in what sense these Native Americans retained 
and fought-for their identities as Cherokees. To understand this side of the 
picture, it is necessary to examine the rationale for the Cherokee Nation. 
 
b. Race as Nation 
 
In the early 1800s, the destabilization of the traditional Cherokee clan 
system led to the consolidation of the tribe around the image of the nation-
state.174 As historian Fay Yarbrough observes, “In the nineteenth century, 
the strength of the clan system waned, and the concept of legal citizenship 
substituted for clan in determining legitimate membership in the Cherokee 
Nation.”175 Under the clan system, tribal membership was conferred by 
birth to a Cherokee woman; a matrilineal society, the Cherokee were 
indifferent to the race of the father where membership status was 
 
Euroamerican supremacy. On hegemony and its relation to ideology, see STURM, supra 
note 58, at 19-26 and sources cited therein.  
172 On the status of slaves as both property and (legally responsible) persons, see, e.g. 
MARK TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERATION OF 
HUMANITY AND INTEREST 158-69 (1981); and Arthur F. Howington, “Not in the Condition 
of a Horse or an Ox”: Ford v. Ford, the Law of Testamentary Manumission and the 
Tennessee Courts’ Recognition of Slave Humanity, 34 TENNESSEE HISTORICAL 
QUARTERLY 249-63 (1975). 
173 It is important to observe that significant opposition to Cherokee acculturation to 
white society and its institutions existed within the tribe.  Usually associated with “full-
bloods,” the antipathy to accommodation received spiritual and political form in the 
creation of the Keetoowah Society.  The Society united Cherokee religious self-
understanding and nationalism, and has been characterized as “abolitionist” by some, and 
by others, as “not being pro-slavery, rather than being anti-slavery.” PATRICK N. MINGES,
SLAVERY IN THE CHEROKEE NATION: THE KEETOOWAH SOCIETY AND THE DEFINING OF A 
PEOPLE 1855-1867 83 (2003). 
174 STURM, supra note 58, at 43 (“[The] appropriation and internalization of 
Euroamerican notions of racial identity, in addition to concurrent changes in political 
organization, helped set the stage for the emergence of Cherokee nationalism in the early 
nineteenth century.”). 
175 Fay Yarbrough, Legislating Women’s Sexuality: Cherokee Marriage Laws in the 
Nineteenth Century, 38 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL HISTORY 385-406, 387 (2004). 
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concerned.176 The marginalization of the clan system by Cherokee 
engagement with Euroamerican social, cultural and economic systems 
opened the way for new definitions of Cherokee tribal membership; by 
adopting a Euroamerican model of government as the tribe’s organizing 
principle, membership in a Cherokee clan was put in tension with, and, for 
many, eventually replaced by, Cherokee citizenship.177 
The model of the nation served the Cherokees by providing a dual 
vantage point from which they could alternately project outward, to the 
federal government and to the states of the Union, a self-conception as a 
government, one among many, possessing the rights and dignity appropriate 
to a sovereign.178 The model of the nation also provided the vantage from 
which the tribe could look inward and assign to itself an identity as a people 
according to its own lights. The political identity of the Cherokee Nation 
would reflect both: a sovereign among nations and a people set apart.  
 From the start the national design intentionally imitated key features of 
the United States federal government and the ideology of rights: 
 
In the first three decades of the nineteenth century, [Cherokee] 
leaders established a bicameral legislature, a national police 
force, a supreme court, a elective system of representation based 
on geographic districts rather than towns, and in 1828, a written 
constitution patterned after that of the U.S. federal government.  
They also adopted a concept of tribal sovereignty that ‘shared 
much of the ideology of the individual sovereign states of the 
Union.’ . . . [T]he new Cherokee state gradually displaced town 
politics, becoming the official administrative, bureaucratic, and 
political center of the Cherokees’ newly emerging national 
community.179 
176 See id. at 386-87 (“The offspring of unions between Cherokees became members of 
their mother’s clan. . . . Matrilineal kinship meant that Cherokee women who married non-
Cherokee men knew their children would have an undeniable claim to membership in the 
Nation. Unions between Cherokee men and non-Cherokee women, however, produced 
children with no clan affiliation, and therefore no rights in the Cherokee Nation.  For much 
of Cherokee history, being born Cherokee meant being born of a Cherokee woman.”) 
177 The supplanting of the clan system by the model of national citizenship varies 
among the Cherokee Nation, Eastern Band of Cherokees, and the United Keetoowah Band. 
I also would emphasize that many Cherokees, then and now, retain clan affiliations which 
are strong sources of personal and group identity. 
178 The Cherokees’ negotiation of its sovereign identity vis-à-vis the United States and 
the State of Georgia resulted in the famous Cherokee Cases of the Marshall Court.  See 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
179 STURM, supra note 58, at 52-53; quoting MCLOUGHLIN, CHEROKEE RENASCENCE,
supra note 146, at xvii. See also FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 189 (1984) (Cherokees in 1827 
Constitution “asserted that they were one of the sovereign and independent nations of the 
earth with complete jurisdiction over their own territory”). 
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Race, however, became “a cornerstone of the national identity,” and the 
Cherokee’s adoption of the ideology of “race as nation” implied “that race, 
or racial metaphors of blood or kinship, could be used to define a nation ‘as 
a collective subject, as a superorganism with a unique biological-cultural 
essence.’”180 The “new Cherokee state would increasingly replicate the 
racial ideologies and practices of the U.S. federal and state governments.”181 
As one of its first steps, the new government, in its Constitution of 1827, 
denied persons of “the African race” the right to hold office and the right to 
vote: 
 
Art. III, Sec. 4. No person shall be eligible to a seat in the 
General Council, but a free Cherokee male citizen, who shall 
have attained to the age of twenty-five years. The descendants of 
Cherokee men by all free women, except the African race, 
whose parents may have been living together as man and wife, 
according to the customs and laws of this Nation, shall be 
entitled to all the rights and privileges of this nation, as well as 
the posterity of Cherokee women by all free men. No person 
who is of negro or mulatto parentage, either by the father or 
mother side, shall be eligible to hold any office of profit, honor 
or trust under this Government.182 
Art. III, Sec. 7. All free male citizens, (excepting negroes and 
descendents of white and Indian men by negro women who may 
have been set free,) who shall have attained to the age of 
eighteen years, shall be equally entitled to vote in all public 
elections.183 
The exclusion of persons of African descent from Cherokee Nation office-
holding was continued in the successor to the 1827 Constitution, the post-
Removal 1839 Constitution.184 The 1839 Constitution also carried forward 
the denial of the voting franchise to slaves and women.185 
180 STURM, supra note 58, at 53; quoting Ana Maria Alonso, The Politics of Space, 
Time, and Substance: State Formation, Nationalism, and Ethnicity, 23 ANNUAL REVIEW OF 
ANTHROPOLOGY 379-405, 384 (1994). 
181 STURM, supra note 58, at 54. 
182 CONSTITUTION OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, Art. III, §4 (1827); reproduced in 
STARR, supra note 101, at 56. 
183 CONSTITUTION OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, Art. III, §7 (1827); reproduced id. at 57. 
184 CONSTITUTION OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, Art. III, §5 (1839); reproduced id. at 
123. 
185 CONSTITUTION OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, Art. III, § 7 (1839); reproduced id. at 
124. 
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Even before adoption of the 1827 Constitution, the Cherokee Council 
in the early 1820s passed a series of antimiscegenation laws like the one 
enacted in 1824, which prohibited “[i]ntermarriages between negro slaves, 
and Indians, or whites,” stating such marriages “shall not be lawful,” and 
providing that anyone permitting “their negro slaves, to intermarry with 
Indians or whites” would be liable to “the Cherokee Nation” for a fine; and 
further: 
 
[A]ny male Indian or white man marrying a negro woman slave, 
he or they shall be punished with fifty-nine stripes on the bare 
back, and any Indian or white woman, marrying a negro man 
slave, shall be punished with twenty-five stripes.186 
Such statutes had the effect of intensifying the distinction between 
Cherokees, here referred to racially as “Indians,” in contrast to “negro 
slaves” and “whites.” In this way, Cherokee statutory law assigned roles of 
normative intimacy according to a race-based system of meanings.  Further, 
while the code produced “Indians,” “white men,” and “white women” in 
terms of race and gender, for blacks only the code produced “docile 
bodies,” to use Foucault’s famous phrase, along three axes—race, gender, 
and servitude: “negro woman slave” and “negro man slave.”187 Finally, 
while the code constructs the objects of its control and stipulates their 
normative relationships, it simultaneously establishes “the Cherokee 
Nation” as an offended sovereign, whose authority opposes lawbreakers per 
se, regardless of race or gender, and whose “stripes” produce, in Foucault’s 
terms, “the effect, in the rites of punishment, of a certain mechanism of 
power: of a power that not only did not hesitate to exert itself directly on 
bodies, but was exalted and strengthened by its visible manifestations.”188 
The elimination of licit marriages between “negro slaves” on the one 
hand, and “Indians” or “whites” on the other, focuses on slave-status: the 
1827 Constitution “permitted citizenship, albeit with restrictions, for 
 
186 STURM, supra note 58, at 54. The case of Shoe Boots, a Cherokee male who 
successfully petitioned the Council in 1824 to grant citizenship and freedom to his three 
children by Doll, his slave, is often cited as an exception to the social prohibition of 
intimate partnerships between Cherokees and persons of African descent.  In granting his 
petition, the Council admonished him to father no more children with Doll. The story of 
Shoeboots and Doll as a study of race and power in the Cherokee Nation is examined in the 
excellent book by TIYA MILES, TIES THAT BIND: THE STORY OF AN AFRO-CHEROKEE 
FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM (2005). 
187 On “docile bodies” as the objects of disciplinary systems peculiar to the modern 
age, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 135-69, 
136 (1977) (“A body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved.”). 
188 Id. at 57. Other laws passed by the Cherokee Council prior to Removal reflect 
similar attempts to objective African descendents by denying them the liberties enjoyed by 
Euroamericans: “no contract or bargain entered into with any slave or slaves without the 
approbation of their masters shall be binding” (1819); “no one may purchase any item of 
property from a slave without permission from his owner” (1820); “no slave shall be 
allowed to sell or buy spirituous liquor” (1820). McLaughlin, Red Indians, supra note 132, 
at 381.   
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descendents of Cherokee women and free black men.”189 If the 1827 
Constitution can be said to look backwards, to the older clan system, in this 
recognition of citizenship, the action of the Council in 1825, to grant 
citizenship to the children of Cherokee men married to white women, 
looked forward, to the nation-model of citizenship: “The Cherokee Council 
extended citizenship to ‘the children of Cherokee men and white women 
living in the Cherokee Nation as man and wife’ and made them ‘entitled to 
all the immunities and privileges enjoyed by citizens descending from the 
Cherokee race, by the mother’s side.’”190 As Yarbrough summarizes, 
“Cherokee men could now create Cherokee citizens.”191 
Following the Removal Act of 1830, the pressure of the federal 
government and the State of Georgia, its militia, and lawless white settlers 
to obtain Cherokee land became overwhelming, and in 1835, an 
unauthorized group of Cherokees, a minority of citizens known as the 
Treaty Party, and the United States entered into the Treaty of New Echota 
for the sale of all remaining Cherokee lands east of the Mississippi.  The 
Treaty Party, an elite group of some of the wealthiest plantation owners, 
and their slaves immediately decamped for Indian Territory.192 Though both 
the leadership of the Treaty Party and the majority political body, the 
National Party, owned slaves, the remaining Cherokees, who were more 
culturally conservative, now “associated slavery with the white southerners 
who had forced them from their homes and with the slaveholding 
Cherokees who had signed the fraudulent treaty.”193 Attempts by Principal 
Chief Ross to retain their land base failed, and in the winter of 1838-39, at 
the bayonet-point of thousands of federal troops, approximately 16,000 
Cherokee citizens and their slaves embarked for Indian Territory (present 
day northeastern Oklahoma) on what became known to Cherokees as 
Nunna daul Isunyi, “the trail where we cried.” An estimated one-quarter of 
the tribe and an unknown number of slaves perished on route.  
 The trauma of their forced march, displacement from ancestral lands, 
anger at their betrayal by fellow Cherokees, and ardent desire to survive as a 
nation led almost immediately to two defining political events: the 
confrontation and killing of most of the leaders of the Treaty Party and the 
 
189 Yarbrough, supra note 175, at 389. 
190 Id. at 388. 
191 Id. at 389. 
192 On their arrival, the members of the Treaty Party negotiated their status with a 
group of some 1,130 Cherokees or their descendents known as “the Old Settlers,” who had 
accepted an offer from the United States in 1809-10 to remove to present-day northwestern 
Arkansas; by 1835 when the Treaty Party arrived, the Old Settlers had been pushed into 
northeastern Oklahoma. ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 
105 (1970).  The promulgation of the Constitution of 1839 is significant to the Cherokee 
Nation today in part because it represents the political reunification of the three bodies—
Old Settlers and Treaty Party members plus the descendents of Cherokees who emigrated 
in the 18th century (captioned the “Western Cherokees” in the Preamble) and the majority 
National Party members (“Eastern Cherokees”) under a single government: “The Eastern 
and Western Cherokees having again re-united, and become one body politic, under the 
style and title of the Cherokee Nation . . . .” STARR, supra note 101, at 122.  
193 PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 68. 
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signing of the 1839 Constitution. In these large gestures of sovereignty, the 
Cherokee Nation symbolically witnessed the end of one phase of its 
political life and announced the start of another.194 When, in a ceremony in 
1846, Principal Chief Ross finally accepted the Treaty of New Echota as a 
fait accomplice, he shook hands with his arch enemy, Stand Watie, the sole 
surviving leader of the Treaty Party, and deftly acknowledged the biological 
and nationalistic fundaments of their bond, saying, “We are all of the 
household of the Cherokee family and of one blood . . . embracing each 
other as Countrymen, friends, and relatives.”195 
In the years preceding the Civil War, the Cherokee Nation enacted 
increasingly severe slave codes.  These codes re-entrenched the position of 
the “mixed-blood” elite who once again owned the majority of slaves, 
operated plantations (albeit on a smaller scale), and sought to control the 
Nation’s blood-based political and social identities. Slave rebellions in 
1841, 1842, and 1850196 prompted enactment of even harsher penalties on 
disobedient slaves and those would assist them in emulating the lifestyle of 
the Nation’s citizens. From 1841 to 1859, the following laws were passed 
by the Council (as summarized by McLaughlin): 
 
1841 No slave shall be allowed to carry firearms, knives, dirks, 
or other dangerous weapons 
1842 Any free negro or slave aiding another slave to run away 
shall receive 100 lashes and be removed from the 
Cherokee Nation 
1848 Anyone teaching a negro to read or write shall be 
banished from the Cherokee Nation 
1855 No public school teacher suspected of “entertaining 
sentiments favorable to abolitionism” shall be allowed in 
the Nation 
1859 All free blacks in the Nation shall be required to leave 
(this bill though passed by both houses of the Cherokee 
legislature was vetoed by the chief).197 
As McLoughlin observes, “it can be shown very easily that the status of 
black slaves and black freedmen among the Cherokees declined steadily 
 
194 While Chief Ross and the Cherokee government were not implicated in the 
assassinations of the Nation’s political enemies, the killings “by a group of Cherokees” 
were performed “in accordance with the law of 1829 which had made the cession of 
Cherokee land a capital offense.”  Id. at 73 (describing the deceased as “executed”). Treaty 
Party leader John Ridge had stated, immediately after signing the traitorous Treaty of New 
Echota, “I feel as if I had just signed my own death warrant.” CONLEY, supra note 50, at 
143. No one was ever charged in connection with the deaths. The legal predicate of the 
killings in Cherokee law, known to all, and the attendant political circumstances, make the 
deaths symbolic of an act of sovereignty, even if the killings were performed by individuals 
not acting under color of Cherokee law. 
195 STURM, supra note 58, at 66. 
196 McLoughlin, Red Indians, supra note 132, at 381. 
197 Id. 
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over the years. Accepting the standards of neighboring white civilization, 
the Cherokees gradually adopted all the worst features of Southern black 
slave codes (including the mounted, armed patrols to enforce them).”198 
Yarbrough states, “Throughout the nineteenth century, Cherokee authorities 
sharpened the line between Indians and people of African descent.  The 
Nation also more closely aligned itself with the white race and adopted a 
racial ideology that focused on the difference between black and non-black 
instead of white and non-white”: 
 
That is, whereas American society defined its members in terms 
that distinguished between those who were white and everyone 
else, the Cherokees chose to focus on the similarities among all 
non-black peoples, making the distinction between those who 
were black and everyone else. This new racial identification was 
a great ideological shift for Cherokees who had seen themselves 
as not only distinct from whites, but distinct from other Indian 
tribes as well.199 
Expanding but also fundamentally revising the antimiscegenation law 
of 1824, the first law that the Council passed after Removal, on September 
19, 1839, was entitled, “An Act to Prevent Amalgamation with Colored 
Persons.” The Act elaborated more repressive restrictions on intermarriage 
which included the prohibition of intermarriage “between a free male or 
female citizen with any slave or person of color.”200 Significantly, where 
the 1824 law penalized white or Indian intermarriage with slaves, the post-
Removal law, while retaining this prohibition, conceived the crime as one 
of Cherokee citizens’ “amalgamation with colored persons.” Thus, the first 
act of the new Cherokee government was to impose as a civic obligation the 
avoidance of inter-racial marriage when the citizen’s partner was other than 
white or Cherokee. By statutory implication, to be a “pure blood” Cherokee 
was not to be a “person of color” and to be a good Cherokee citizen was to 
marry within racial boundaries (that is to say, to marry a white or another 
Cherokee).  Further, to underscore the gravity of this racial-civic injunction, 
the penalty for violating the new statute was “fifty stripes for convicted 
females of both races and a hundred lashes for black males whereas the 
[pre-Removal laws] had punished black and Cherokee males equally but 
more severely than females.”201 
Yarbrough argues that the anti-amalgamation law “may have reflected 
a larger legal effort to protect the racial purity of the Cherokee Nation” by 
deterring men of African descent from forming intimate unions with 
Cherokee women, or by creating an incentive for Cherokee women to seek 
 
198 Id. 
199 Yarbrough, supra note 175, at 389. 
200 PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 84.  
201 Id. 
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out Cherokee men.202 Sturm echoes this theme in the context of citizenship 
criteria, when she observes that “[b]y excluding African Americans from 
the body politic, the Cherokee state was reproducing nineteenth-century 
Euroamerican racial ideologies in its own legislation, including the idea that 
national identity was linked to racial identity and the notion that ‘race-
mixing’ with African Americans was polluting.”203 In 1840 the Cherokees 
went even further, to make it unlawful for “any free negro or mulatto, not of
Cherokee blood, to hold or own any improvements within the limits of this 
Nation.”204 As Sturm explains, “The wording of this legislation is 
significant because it marks the first time when Cherokees officially began 
to conflate ideas of race and blood in their own political discourse and 
practices.”205 Finally, historian Karen Woods writes that “[t]he regulation 
of ‘tribal blood’ through miscegenation laws was part of a policy to keep 
Cherokee property in the hands of Cherokee citizens and to protect 
sovereignty through the preservation of ‘Indian-ness.’”206 
In summary, the rise of the Cherokee Nation effected a displacement of 
the traditional clan system, and with it, the exclusive right of Cherokee 
women to define, by their bodies, who would become members of the tribe. 
As my review of Cherokee law has shown, however, the construction of 
Cherokee identity along lines of race did not abandon biology when it 
assumed the form of nation.  Rather, Cherokee law, as represented in its 
Constitution of 1827, Constitution of 1839, slave codes, and other acts of 
the legislature established Cherokee citizenship criteria as the elaboration of 
possibilities inherent in biological lineage, opening up the strictly 
matrilineal system to allow Cherokee men to generate new citizens through 
exogamy. The commitment of the Nation’s mixed-blood elite to the 
economic system of plantation slavery, however, presented dangerous 
opportunities for class-transgressions with slaves and miscegenation with 
blacks, free or slave. In response, the Nation devoted considerable energy 
and attention to constructing and policing racial boundaries for the good of 
the Nation and, by 1840, for the purity of “Cherokee blood.”  Indeed, by 
then, they were one and the same.207 
202 Yarbrough, supra note 175, at 393.  Cherokee legislation in the 1840s and 1850s 
also made it increasingly difficult for white men to marry Cherokee women.  The legal 
obstacles, involving a license application, a petition to the Council, testimonials of 
character from Cherokees, a significant fee, and, finally, an oath of allegiance of the 
Cherokee Nation, may have been promoted more by a desire to police national boundaries 
against dangerous white males than by a desire for racial purity. No corresponding 
obstacles existed for white women wishing to marry Cherokee men. Nonetheless, the laws 
had the effect, for Cherokee women, of concentrating the pool of easily-available suitors to 
Cherokee males.  See id. at 398-400. 
203 STURM, supra note 58, at 70-71. 
204 Id. at 71 (emphasis added). 
205 Id. 
206 Karen M. Woods, A “Wicked and Mischievous Connection”: The Origins of 
Indian-White Miscegenation Law, 23 LEGAL STUD. FORUM 37, 61 (1999). 
207 Legal scholar Ariela Gross writes, “For some Native Americans [in the early 
nineteenth century], the conflation of ‘race’ and ‘nation’ offered some hop of avoiding 
being lumped together with African Americans as ‘people of color.’” Ariela Gross, Beyond 
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4. The Limits of Biological Definitions of Citizenship 
 
The utility of “Cherokee blood” as a marker for citizenship is limited 
by the inaccuracy of the Dawes Rolls and by the Rolls’ reliance on 
nineteenth-century race science. The Rolls’ inaccuracy is especially evident 
in three areas. 
 First, though purporting to separately identify Cherokees by blood and 
Freedmen, many on the Freedmen’s roll descended from persons with 
“Indian blood.” Despite the best efforts of the Nation’s laws to prevent 
miscegenation, persons of African and Cherokee descents did marry and 
have children: the 1835 census reveals a small percentage of self-identified 
“Mixed ‘Negro”” Cherokees in North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and 
Tennessee.208 Following Removal, missionaries “reported that intermarriage 
continued and [antimiscegenation] laws were not enforced.”209 Historian 
Tiya Miles summarizes the matter, stating, “Interracial marriage in the slave 
quarters and in free communities of color meant that the Black population 
and the Indian population were overlapping and expanding and that the 
slave population included more and more persons of Black and Native 
descent.”210 This does not even take into account the descendents of persons 
born outside of marriage, perhaps as slaves, whose parents were of African 
and Cherokee descent.211 Indeed, in an anthropological study conducted 
between 1926 and 1928, more than 25 percent of the African American 
population reported having Native American ancestry.212 
Yet, the Freedmen’s roll systematically excluded evidence of Native 
American ancestry, and agents refused to record it, even when proffers of 
proof of “Indian blood” were made by enrollees themselves. For example, 
Mary Walker, a woman of African-Cherokee heritage, attempted to enroll 
as a Cherokee citizen “by blood,” after reciting her Cherokee ancestry to an 
agent of the Dawes Commission.  She was refused by a second agent 
present, who insisted she be enrolled as a Freedman’s descendent, saying, 
“She ain’t no Cherokee. She’s a nigger. That woman is a nigger and you are 
 
Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race and Slavery, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 640, 681 
(2001). 
208 Percentage of Cherokee population by state (1835): North Carolina (0.5), Georgia 
(0.01), Alabama (0.3), Tennessee (1.2). THORNTON, supra note 42, at 53. 
209 PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 85.  
210 Miles, supra note 111, at 145. 
211 On the history of the use of African-descended women’s bodies by their Native 
American slave masters, see Miles, supra note 111, at 149-53. When the Cherokee Council 
passed a rape law in 1839, it mandated the death penalty for the rape of a free woman 
“lacking negro blood,” regardless of the race of the perpetrator; however, “the statute is 
maddeningly silent” on whether the Nation even recognized the crime of rape of a black 
woman, free or slave.  Yarbrough, supra note 175, at 393.  See also SCOTT L. 
MALCOMSON, ONE DROP OF BLOOD: THE AMERICAN MISADVENTURE OF RACE 98 (2000) 
(“Out-of-wedlock mixed-race children [i.e., African-Cherokee] were not uncommon.”). 
212 Miles, supra note 111, at 144; citing MELVILLE HERSKOVITS, THE AMERICAN 
NEGRO: A STUDY OF RACE CROSSING (1928). 
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going to put her down as a nigger.”213 If not excluding enrollees from the 
“blood” rolls based on their appearance alone, Dawes agents channeled 
enrollees like Mary Walker onto the Freedmen’s roll by applying the rule of 
hypodescent, the so-called “one drop” rule, devised by Euroamerican slave 
owners, whereby “a person who has one drop of Black blood is Black,”214 
and therefore ineligible for inclusion on the Cherokee “blood” rolls.215 
Because the Freedmen’s roll systematically omits proof of Cherokee 
ancestry where such ancestry could be established by independent evidence, 
and because there is no other Dawes roll on which such ancestry can appear, 
the Dawes Rolls are incomplete and therefore cannot serve as an accurate 
resource for identifying all Cherokees by “blood.”216 
Second, the Dawes Rolls elided the Cherokee ancestry of African-
descended persons by accepting only proof of Cherokee “blood” through 
the applicant’s mother.217 Although, as we have seen, the Anti-
Amalgamation Act penalized intermarriage of both male and female 
Cherokee citizens with “persons of color,” and imposed capital punishment 
for the rape of Cherokee women by men of any race, it is unknown, as 
historian Yarbrough states, whether Cherokee statutory law even penalized 
sexual intercourse, consensual or non-consensual, between Cherokee men 
 
213 STURM, supra note 58, at 189.  
214 Miles, supra note 111, at 147.  On the presumptions of white “blood” superiority 
that underpin the rule of hypodescent, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is 
Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 26 (1991) (“[H]ypodescent imposes racial subordination 
through its implied validation of white racial purity.”). For a response to Gotanda which 
argues for “a more balanced view of the one-drop rule” in the context of multiracial 
classifications by the U.S. census, see Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop 
Rule: Racial Categories, African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 
1166 (1997). 
215 At the same time, Dawes agents confronted with persons of Euroamerican-
Cherokee ancestry systematically included them on the Cherokee by blood rolls. This 
selective use of hypodescent illustrates that the method operated within a larger hierarchy 
of races and “bloods.” Some Freedmen or descendents sued to establish their Native 
American heritage according to biology, but were consistently rebuffed by the courts, who 
ruled that “the Dawes Commission was a quasi-judicial tribunal and that its findings 
concerning the amount of blood or the existence of Indian blood could not be attacked by 
outside evidence.” Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian 
Law to 1935, 51 S.D. L. REV. 1, 43 (2006). 
216 As legal scholar Carla Pratt states, regarding the enrollment of the Seminoles, “The 
creation of the Blood Roll as the official record of all Indians generated the false cultural 
belief within the tribe, the federal government, and American society that all of the ‘real’ 
Indians were named on the Blood Roll, and the people on the Freedmen Roll were ‘just 
black.’” Carla D. Pratt, Tribal Kulturkampf: The Role of Race in Constructing Native 
American Identity, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1241, 1255 (2005).  
217 See DEBO, STILL THE WATERS RUN, supra note 82, at 42: 
Apparently at the time of the enrolment the Dawes Commission regularly 
enrolled all with apparent Negro blood as freedmen.  If any of them had 
Indian blood they were not recognized as Indians by tribal law, for there was 
no way by which a valid marriage could be contracted.  Illegitimate children 
of white fathers and Negro mothers are, of course, uniformly classed as 
Negroes by white Americans, and the Indians had followed the same rule. 
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and African-descended women.218 Given the unequal positions of power 
between Cherokee masters and their African slaves, and the disincentives 
created by Cherokee law for intermarriage between black men and 
Cherokee women, or rape of Cherokee women by black men, it is 
reasonable to expect that the typical descendent of otherwise prohibited 
interracial unions would be African-descended through the mother’s line.  
The Dawes registration system, based on its own “amalgamation” of Indian 
blood and matrilineal preference-making, shunted descendents of Cherokee 
men and African women onto the Freedmen’s roll.  Because this 
“amalgamation” of race and matrilinearity resulted in reducing the roster of 
persons otherwise eligible for inclusion on the Cherokee “blood” rolls, the 
Dawes Rolls are incomplete and therefore cannot serve as an accurate 
resource for identifying all Cherokees by “blood.” 
 Third, biology is limited in its ability to establish citizenship when 
otherwise-eligible persons choose not to participate in the legal process by 
which biology-based citizenship is established.  When the Dawes 
Commission came to enroll tribal members, many culturally conservative 
Cherokees refused to participate, on the grounds that land severance 
violated basic principles of Cherokee society. These Cherokees, like 
similar-minded members of other tribes in Indian Territory, saw clearly that 
break-up of their tribal land base was just the first step in a larger federal 
project to destroy their indigenous cultures.  Called “irreconcilables,” and 
often associated with “full-bloodedness,” these tribal members adopted 
individual and coordinated strategies to discourage other Cherokees from 
enrolling, and to try to avoid the federal agents sent to seek them out.219 
However, as Garroutte points out, “the descendents of those traditionalists 
find themselves worse off, in the modern, legal context, for their forbearers’ 
success in the fight to maintain cultural integrity. By the criteria their tribes 
have established, they can never become enrolled citizens.”220 The plight of 
the “irreconcilables” shows that biology is a problematic predicate for 
Cherokee citizenship when the legal regime establishing citizenship faces a 
legitimacy-crisis in the eyes of a significant number of biologically-eligible 
Cherokees.  The story of the “irreconcilables” also indicates that biology-
based citizenship requirements were problematic not only to the Freedmen, 
but to a wider social constituency of the Nation.  To the extent that 
biological Cherokees refused to grant legitimacy to the Dawes Rolls by 
 
218 Yarbrough, supra note 175, at 393, and discussion supra, note 211 and 
accompanying text. 
219 See DEBO, STILL THE WATERS RUN, supra note 82, at 54 (“With the Indian genius 
for collective action, the Creek, Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw irreconcilables formed 
the Four Mothers Society, said at one time to have twenty-four thousand members.”); 57 
(“When they refused to register their choice, the Dawes Commission made the selection for 
them . . . but the Indians refused to accept the selections, and when the certificates and 
patents were mailed to them, they returned them.”); id. at 98 (“The fullblood Cherokees 
were brought from the remote hill settlements and guided through the land office by the 
real estate speculators in the same manner as the Choctaws.”). 
220 GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 22, 
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participating in enrollment, the Rolls are incomplete and therefore cannot 
serve as an accurate resource for identifying all Cherokees by “blood.” 
 The problems of hypodescent, race-matrilinearity, and social legitimacy 
identified above point to a more fundamental limitation on using biology to 
establish Cherokee citizenship. The Dawes Rolls’ taxonomy of possible 
Cherokee citizens is flawed because it rests upon the “long-discredited 
belief that each race [has] its own blood type, which [is] correlated with 
physical appearance.”221 It is quite likely that the Dawes agents who denied 
Mary Walker enrollment on the “blood” rolls would have agreed with the 
postulate of nineteenth-century race science that “blood will tell.”  
 The roots of race science can be traced to Samuel Morton, the 
American scientist whose work from 1831 to 1851 rejected monogenesis 
and the biblically-inspired single-origin theory of “the races” in favor of a 
polygenetic theory of multiple human origins in multiple races, which was 
still, however, based in Christian scripture.222 Morton ranked “the races” in 
terms of intelligence and cultural superiority based on various features 
(circumference, volume) of their skulls.  Morton’s conclusions, which 
placed Caucasians at the top of the hierarchy, consigned members of the 
“colored races”—including both Indians and blacks—to the lower ranks, 
and squared neatly with the racist ideology of southern planters, who 
welcomed Morton’s work.  On his death in 1851, a leading scientific 
journal praised him, saying, “We of the South should consider him as our 
benefactor, for aiding most materially in giving to the negro his true 
position as an inferior race.”223 
Morton was succeeded by Lewis Henry Morgan, whose Darwin-
inspired theories of social evolution would prove highly influential in the 
period when the Dawes Rolls were constructed.  Morgan predicted the 
imminent extinction of Native Americans as being biologically weaker—
frailer—than their white competitors, “the fittest,” who would “survive” 
them.224 The notion that “races” compete for survival, and fare better or 
worse based in part on their intrinsic qualities, readily tracked the racist 
ideologies of the day and did nothing to disturb either the racial essentialism 
underlying American public policy and popular opinion225 or 
 
221 Lawrence Wright, One Drop of Blood, NEW YORKER, July 25, 1994, at 46, 48.   
222 The following account of the rise of race science is indebted to DAVID HURST 
THOMAS, SKULL WARS: KENNEWICK MAN, ARCHEOLOGY, AND THE BATTLE FOR NATIVE 
AMERICAN IDENTITY (2000), esp. 36-43 (“A Short History of Scientific Racism in 
America”) and STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1996), esp. 62-104 
(“American Polygeny and Craniometry before Darwin: Blacks and Indians as Separate, 
Inferior Species”). 
223 THOMAS, supra note 222, at 42. 
224 The following account of Social Darwinism is indebted to THOMAS, supra, note 
222, 44-51 (“Darwin and the Disappearing American Indian”) and 102-120 (“The Perilous 
Idea of Race”) 
225 High fertility rates among recent U.S. immigrants from southern and eastern Europe 
during the period 1880 to 1920, and an influx of Irish immigrants, created great distress 
among “native born” Americans, who articulated their fears in terms of race and decried 
the “suicide of race” (Theodore Roosevelt).  See Barry Edmonston & Jeffrey S. Passel, 
How Immigration and Intermarriage Affect the Racial and Ethnic Composition of the U.S. 
50 TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY [20-Aug-06 
 
anthropologists’ rankings of “the races” according to physiognomy.226 As a 
result, “blood” still past from generation to generation, albeit now under the 
twin constraints of inter-race competition and its own inherent, biological 
limitations.   
 Progressive social science at the end of the nineteenth century, 
therefore, carried forward the Euroamerican racial significations of previous 
centuries, but authorized them within a new disciplinary matrix of federal 
Indian law and policy.227 The plan of the federal government to allot tribal 
lands to Indians in severalty, despite its often clumsy or corrupt 
implementation in the field,228 represents the operation of law under the 
conditions of race science: both science and “common sense” showed 
Indians to be a weak and vanishing race, whose only hope lay in 
assimilation and the embrace of private property; and “negroes” to be even 
less evolved than Indians and naturally suited only for the subsistence 
farming that their allotments would provide.229 That the biological theories 
underpinning these social policies and their racist ideologies are utterly 
false is now virtually beyond challenge.230 As Garroutte states: 
 
Population, in IMMIGRATION AND OPPORTUNITY: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND EMPLOYMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES 373, 374 (Frank D. Bean & Stephanie Bell-Rose, eds. 1999), cited and 
discussed in L. Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament of Tribes, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 702, 752 n. 329 (2001). 
226 “Although Morton’s belief in separate racial creations was largely forgotten after 
the Civil War, the almost obsessive urge to classify human skulls into fixed, unchanging 
races or hereditary “types” continued undiminished.  During this period . . . mainstream 
anthropology was still dividing humanity into a fixed number of races.”  THOMAS, supra 
note 222, at 103. 
227 See Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-
Century Race Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1923, 1940 (2000) (“By the late nineteenth century, 
the connection between whiteness and the ability to be part of the American body politic 
had been underscored by race scientists, some working from the humanist traditions of 
history and philosophy, and others working in the new fields of natural history opened up 
by Charles Darwin and others.”).  
228 See Margo S. Brownell, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the 
Question at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 275, 280 (2001) 
(Dawes Rolls “blood quantum determinations were carelessly performed and routinely 
inaccurate.”). 
229 The “common sense” that accepted the rule of hypodescent in early twentieth 
century America, for example, is reflected in views on the intelligence of persons of 
African-European ancestry.  As historian Murray Wickett reports, “[M]ost whites did 
believe that they [black-white persons] were more intelligent than pure blacks. One 
[Oklahoma] settler referred to a mulatto family that lived close by as ‘clean colored folks, 
you know, they wasn’t . . . real dark. They . . . weren’t niggers you know. Just mulattos.” 
MURRAY R. WICKETT, CONTESTED TERRITORY: WHITES, NATIVE AMERICANS AND 
AFRICAN AMERICANS IN OKLAHOMA, 1865-1907 40 (2000). On the social and legal history 
of “nigger,” see RANDALL KENNEDY, NIGGER: THE STRANGE CAREER OF A TROUBLESOME 
WORD (2002). See also Michael A. Elliott, Telling the Difference: Nineteenth-Century 
Legal Narratives of Racial Taxonomy, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 611, 617 (“[L]aws that 
defined race through biological ancestry became more common only after Reconstruction, 
and the fraction of ‘blood’ requisite for African American identity most often decreased 
after the turn of the twentieth century.”). 
230 In the following quotation from legal scholar Scott Gould, “the Dawes Rolls” 
may be substituted for “the census” to the same effect:  
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A final concern [with] biological definitions of [Native 
American] identity is their inextricable entanglement with the 
notion of race. Biological definitions promote the notion that 
“race” constitutes an objective, genetically based difference 
between groups of people. Most Americans accept this 
assumption, unaware that it runs contrary to most current 
scientific knowledge, which tends to view racial distinctions as 
significant social, but not biological, realities.231 
Consequently, the wisdom of employing the Dawes Rolls as a 
determinant of Native American identity must be questioned; especially, 
though not only, the use of those rolls which claim to denote “Indians by 
blood.” They should be questioned not because they are inaccurate 
indicators of Native American ancestry for those listed (though they may be 
that as well),232 but because they recapitulate a system of race hierarchies 
based on bogus science.  
 
D. From Biology to Ancestry, From Legal Fetishism to Law 
 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that a tribal citizenship system, 
like that of the Cherokee Nation, which relies exclusively on the Dawes 
Rolls, necessarily authorizes membership-determinations based on 
nineteenth-century categories of race.233 The system does so not because of 
the personal animus of present-day tribal leaders or registration officials 
toward persons of color.234 The Dawes Rolls reflect in very specific ways, 
 
Considerable doubt exists whether race can even be quantified scientifically. 
Prior to the science of genetics, racial characterizations were believed to be 
inherited by blood, hence the preoccupation with blood quanta in the census.  
References to Indians as “full-bloods” and “mixed bloods” in the nineteenth 
century (and persisting into the twenty-first) stem from this misconception. 
Racial divisions based on genes are also proving unreliable . . . Indeed, the 
recently completed mapping of the human genome suggests that humans and 
their nearest primate relatives, the chimpanzees, may share an almost 
identical set of genes. . . . There is no taxonomic basis in biology or 
physiology to support the racial distinctions used by the U.S. Census. 
Gould, supra note 225, at 754-55. See also Wright, supra note 227, at 53 (“Whatever the 
word ‘race’ may mean elsewhere in the world, or to the world of science, it is clear that in 
America the categories are arbitrary, confused, and hopelessly meaningless.”). 
231 GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 58. 
232 See id. at 24 (discussing the phenomenon of “five-dollar Indians”—white 
homesteaders who bribed Dawes agents to be listed on the blood rolls).  
233 “Southern historians should not be surprised that the concern with ‘blood’ that 
Indians throughout the nation now share originated in the antebellum South where the 
economic, social, and political system rested on the enslavement of one race by another. 
The legacy of slavery was a regional obsession with race as a signifier of power.”  PERDUE,
“MIXED BLOOD,” supra note 112, at 98. 
234 Cherokee people, like others in the United States, are not immune from color bias. 
Sturm’s interviews with individual Cherokees identified “a long-held Cherokee bias against 
dark skin” and a bias toward light-skinned persons.  STURM, supra note 58, at 189-90.  One 
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however, the effects of race hierarchies (and normative assumptions of 
gender, legitimacy, property, and law) which are reproduced anew each 
time the Nation processes an application for tribal membership and each 
time the federal government does, or does not, issue a Certificate of Degree 
of Indian Blood. For the Cherokee Nation, and perhaps for other Indian 
nations who look to the Dawes Rolls for citizenship criteria, what seems to 
be required is no less than the rescue of ancestry from biology.235 
By “biology,” I mean the social construction of racial identities upon 
heredity, as demonstrated in the history of Cherokee self-identity and 
Cherokee citizenship requirements in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. If Cherokee national identity is to escape its continued 
construction upon the effects of a spurious race science, Cherokees must be 
attentive to their “official” genealogy’s structural and historical affiliation 
with that false god, and re-imagine criteria of citizenship based not on 
“Indian blood” but on new, non-racialized understandings of and 
appreciation for Cherokee ancestry.236 
But Cherokees must also rescue law from legalism—an attachment to 
the authority of the Dawes Rolls that borders on fetishism.237 The power of 
 
of her informants, speaking in the late 1990s, said, “Cherokees have always prided 
themselves in being a light-skinned people.”  Id. at 190.  Sturm comments on this 
statement, saying, “A Cherokee bias against dark skin, the result of their adaptation of a 
system of African racial slavery in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, provides the 
simplest and more direct explanation for their social treatment and racial classification of 
multiracial individuals with black ancestry even today.”  Id. 
235 On the distinction of race and ancestry in Native American tribes, as it pertains to 
federal protections against race-based discrimination under the Fifteenth Amendment, see 
Gavin Clarkson, Not Because They Are Brown, but Because of Ea: Rice v. Cayetano, 528 
U.S. 495 (2000), 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 921, 950 (2001) (“The [concurring Justices’] 
fixation on race is ill-founded when dealing with the political status of Indian tribal 
membership. The color of one’s skin is not the determining factor for tribal membership; it 
is one’s ancestry. For Indian tribes, ancestry need not be a proxy for race.”). 
236 See Joyce A. McCray Pearson, Red and Black—A Divided Seminole Nation: Davis 
v. U.S., 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 607, 630 (2005) (“Yes, ancestry is important. But when 
the truth about ancestry is obscured by man-made constructs and rules that divide people 
purely along racial lines and the way they look, as in the case of the Dawes Rolls, it is 
imperative that we take time to try and undo those wrongs.”); John Rockwell Snowden, 
Wayne Tyndall & David Smith, American Indian Sovereignty and Naturalization: It’s a 
Race Thing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 171, 236 (2001) (calling on tribes to reject race-based 
citizenship criteria); and Rennard Strickland, Things Not Spoken: The Burial of Native 
American History, Law and Culture: The Harry Batchelor Address, 13 ST. THOMAS L. 
REV. 11, 15 (2000) (on the irrational and culturally destructive effects of the Dawes Rolls 
today). 
237 On the idea of “legal fetishism” as a regard for legal regimes such as the Dawes 
Rolls which fails to give sufficient attention to the role of the subject in producing, 
interpreting, or organizing those regimes, see, e.g., Anthony Paul Farley, The Apogee of the 
Commodity, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1229, 1233 (2004) (“We have been trained to see, and do 
in fact see, the rules as if they determine the circumstances of their own application. This is 
legal fetishism.”).  Farley understands Euroamerican law in North America since the 17th 
century as devoted to the commodification of blacks by whites: “A fetish is an artifact that 
is treated as if it were not the product of human work. . . . Law, looked upon as if it were 
something other than the force of the system of marks and the system of property, is a 
fetish. Law, looked upon as if it were something other than white-over-black, is a fetish. 
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the Dawes Rolls over Cherokee political identity is evident in the 
citizenship provisions of the 1975 Constitution,238 the 1999 Constitution,239 
the opinion of the Lucy Allen majority,240 and in the following statement by 
Chief Smith, defending the race-impartiality of Cherokee citizenship 
criteria:  
 
The other thing that is clear is that the Cherokee Nation 
Constitution is not based on race. People of many different 
ethnic backgrounds, African Americans, white Americans and 
Hispanic Americans, have Cherokee ancestors on the Dawes 
Roll [sic]; and they are unquestionably entitled to Cherokee 
Nation citizenship. However, someone will undoubtedly play the 
race card in this debate.241 
The attachment of Cherokee law to the Dawes Rolls is reminiscent of 
the authority attached to another artifact of colonialism, the Bible (“the 
English book”), when it was introduced to the people of India, as presented 
by postcolonial theorist, Homi Bhabha: 
 
The discovery of the book is, at once, a moment of originality 
and authority.  It is, as well, a process of displacement that, 
paradoxically, makes the presence of the book wondrous to the 
extent it is repeated, translated, misread, displaced. . . [T]he 
emblem of the English book—‘signs taken for wonders’—[is] an 
 
Law is white-over-black, white-over-black only, and that continually.”  Id. at 1236. On the 
fetishizing of human rights, to avoid dealing with structural social problems in the context 
of South Africa, see RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
IN SOUTH AFRICA: LEGITIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE (2001). See also Jack M. 
Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal 
Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105 (1993); Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The Postmodern 
Transition: Law and Politics, in THE FATE OF LAW 79 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, 
eds. 1991); and Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading: Toward a 
Postmodern Conception of Law, 14 J.L. & SOC’Y 297 (1987). 
238 CONSTITUTION OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, Art. III, § 1 (1975) (“All members of 
the Cherokee Nation must be citizens as proven by reference to the Dawes Commission 
Rolls . . . .”). 
239 CONSTITUTION OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, Art. IV, § 1 (1999) (“All citizens of the 
Cherokee Nation must be original enrollees or descendants of original enrollees listed on 
the Dawes Commission Rolls . . . .”). 
240 “[T]he 1975 Constitution affirms these rights by linking citizenship to one single 
document: the Dawes Rolls.” Lucy Allen, at 4.  The Lucy Allen majority affirms the 
importance of Cherokee ancestry (which it calls “blood”) while challenging the legal 
hegemony that the Dawes Rolls exercises over Cherokee citizenship, stating, “It is not clear 
that the Dawes Commission had any appreciation for the fact that Indian blood, of the 
various tribes, is different. Shawnee blood is not Cherokee blood.  Delaware blood is not 
Cherokee blood. It is important for this Court to question whether all these federal blood 
degrees really matter today, for purposes of Cherokee citizenship laws.”  Id. at 8-9. 
241 Freedmen Statement, supra note 17 (emphasis added). 
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insignia of colonial authority and a signifier of colonial desire 
and discipline.242 
The Dawes Rolls, too, are such an “insignia” of colonial authority (over 
Native Americans), desire (for land), and discipline (of Indians “by blood,” 
and the “adopted” peoples: “Freedmen,” “Intermarried Whites,” and 
“adopted” Shawnee and Delaware).  Like the enunciation of “the English 
book,” the action of Congress to close the rolls of the Cherokee Nation as of 
March 4, 1907,243 was a moment of “originality and authority” for the tribe, 
and, with each new member created, each Freedmen lawsuit, each struggle 
over the right to set citizenship criteria, the authority of the Dawes Rolls has 
grown ever more “wondrous.”244 
In place of this legal fetishism of the Dawes Rolls, which alienates 
Cherokees from their sovereign power of self-determination, I believe the 
Cherokee Nation should begin to consider alternative criteria for 
establishing national citizenship.245 In short, I believe Cherokees must 
reclaim ancestry from biology and articulate a new political relationship to 
their individual and collective pasts, one which does not use law to deploy 
categories based on colonialist racial ideologies to exclude potential 
citizens.  
To decide the question of the Freedmen’s descendents’ status, I 
suggest, Cherokee citizens, including the Freedmen’s descendents, should 
engage in a searching dialogue on political and social identity, one that 
expressly includes race. In the following part, I will elaborate a version of 
the model of Radical Indigenism, articulated by Eva Garroutte, as one way 
in which such a dialogue might be conducted, and explore how it could 
organize discussion around the Freedmen controversy. 
 
242 HOMI BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 145-46 (1994). 
243 The rolls of the Cherokee Nation were closed by Act of Congress, April 26, 1906 
(34 Stat. 137), effective March 4, 1907.  After 1907, “some duplications were canceled, 
and 312 names were added by act of Congress in 1914. DEBO, STILL THE WATERS RUN,
supra note 82, at 47. 
244 See Mark Neath, American Indian Gaming Enterprises and Tribal Membership: 
Race, Exclusivity, and a Perilous Future, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 689 (1995) 
(“[T]hat federal practices that were designed to assimilate the Indian population employed 
blood quantum as the measure of Indian identity suggests a deep irony in tribal acceptance 
of similar blood quantum requirements.”) 
245 The irony that the displaced tribes of Oklahoma, who lost much of their land bases 
through allotment based on the method of “blood quantum,” would fixate on “blood 
quantum” as an indicia of citizenship in their own nations is not lost on Perdue, who writes, 
“[A]llotment rolls with their ‘blood quantum’ became the basis of modern tribal 
membership, and in a great historical irony, the language of blood permeates tribal politics 
into the twenty-first century.”  PERDUE, “MIXED BLOOD,” supra note 112, at 98. 
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III. RADICAL INDIGENISM AS A RESOURCE FOR RESOLVING THE FREEDMEN 
CONTROVERSY 
A. Foundational Commitments 
 
The model of Radical Indigenism set forth by Garroutte attempts to 
offer a way for academics to engage in scholarly research about Native 
Americans while respecting the worldviews of the indigenous peoples they 
study.246 As Garroutte explains, “radical” does not intend to connote either a 
commitment to Marxist theory or an unnecessarily confrontational stance, 
but rather a focus on the “root” (radix) of indigenous knowledge, and its 
sources in the community and tradition: 
 
Radical Indigenism illuminates differences in assumptions about 
knowledge that are at the root of the dominant culture’s 
misunderstanding and subordination of indigenous knowledge. It 
argues for the reassertion and rebuilding of traditional 
knowledge from its roots, its fundamental principles.247 
I propose it, and adapt it, as a possible model by which indigenous 
communities like the Cherokee Nation, who are struggling to define their 
political identities, may do so from within their own assumptions and 
methods and not in response to heteronymous criteria.248 
Consistent with the above, therefore, a foundational commitment of the 
model as I propose it is to the right of federally-recognized tribes to 
determine their criteria for citizenship. 249 A corollary of this commitment is 
the rejection of the view, expressed by some scholars, that Congress should 
exercise its plenary power over Indian tribes, or federal courts should 
 
246 GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 101-104 (identifying Radical Indigenism and 
distinguishing it from both “academic colonialism” and postcolonial theory). 
247 Id. at 101. 
248 The version of Radical Indigeneity that I propose has resonance with the project set 
forth in Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: 
Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 191, 196 (2001) (“[Cultural sovereignty is] the effort of Indian nations and Indian 
people to exercise their own norms and values in structuring their collective futures”); and 
id. at 197 (“[T]he central challenge of cultural sovereignty is to reach an understanding of 
sovereignty that is generated from within tribal societies and carries a cultural meaning 
consistent with those traditions.”) (emphasis in original). In my view, however, the 
challenge tribal self-governance faces today argues for, rather than against, an enhanced 
role for political sovereignty; hence my first foundational commitment, infra notes 249-50 
and accompanying text.   
249 The first foundational commitment is my own and does not necessarily reflect 
Garroutte’s understanding of Radical Indigenism, though I believe it is consistent with the 
version of the model she presents in REAL INDIANS.
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expand their interpretations of existing laws, to abrogate tribal sovereign 
immunity and limit the scope of permissible tribal citizenship criteria.250 
A second basic commitment of the model is to the rationality of 
indigenous worldviews, “that American Indian (and other indigenous) 
philosophies of knowledge are rational, articulable, coherent logics for 
ordering and knowing the world.”251 Thus, no matter how different from 
Euroamerican conceptions of the world an indigenous worldview may be,252 
it remains possible in theory to specify that worldview in terms of tribal or 
band membership criteria, and in the case of indigenous groups that are 
patterned after nations, in terms of citizenship criteria. 
 A third strong commitment of the model is to the modest role any one 
person should play in the articulation of both problems and solutions 
affecting one’s tribe; in this regard, I echo Garroutte, herself a citizen of the 
Cherokee Nation, when she says that “[w]hat follows is not meant as a 
prescription for how tribes should think about identity issues; rather, it is a 
suggestive exploration of a place from which they might begin to work out 
their own definitions of identity with the participation of all their 
members.”253 This implies a corresponding commitment on the part of 
individual tribal members to submit individual notions of citizenship criteria 
to the test of collective deliberation by the tribe as a whole. 
 
250 See, e.g., Eric Reitman, An Argument for the Partial Abrogation of Federally 
Recognized Indian Tribes’ Sovereign Power over Membership, 92 VA. L. REV. 793, 863 
(2006) (“Bearing in mind the destructive potential of plenary membership power . . . 
Congress should exercise its power over federally recognized Indian tribes and abrogate, at 
least in part, tribal citizenship power.”); Williamson, supra note 170, at 262-68 (urging 
action by executive agencies, Congress, and courts to protect Freedmen’s descendents from 
“discriminatory tribal policies” by imposing federal equal protection guarantees); Pratt, 
Tribes and Tribulations, supra note 170, at 113-14 (urging action by Congress to grant 
citizenship to Freedmen’s descendents where “self-determination becomes an oppressive 
tool used to exclude some Indians on the basis of race. . . . [W]hen the restriction or 
limitation on tribal membership is rooted in notions of racial superiority, it does not serve 
any legitimate purpose.”); Pratt, Tribal Kulturkampf, supra note 216, at 1260 (“The use of 
sovereign immunity to protect tribal identity . . .  ignores the racist origins of the legal rules 
that define Indian Seminole identity and serves to further subjugate people of color, 
specifically black Indians, by continuing the enforcement of the corrupt rule of hypo-
descent.”). For arguments rejecting the abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity and the 
compromise of the right of tribes to set citizenship criteria, see esp. Riley, supra note 39; 
Goldberg, Members Only?, supra note 104.  See also Carole Goldberg, American Indians 
and “Preferential” Treatment, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 943 (2002) (responding to equality-
based challenges to Indian law); and Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 1373 (2002) (analyzing the race-ing of Indians in federal law). 
251 GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 113. 
252 There is of course an extensive literature on the differences between Euroamerican 
and Native American worldviews and spiritual traditions. From indigenous perspectives, 
see, e.g., VINE DELORIA, GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION (30th anniversary ed. 
2003); and AMERICAN INDIAN THOUGHT (Anne Waters, ed. 2004) (philosophical essays by 
indigenous authors). 
253 GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 113. 
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B. Assumptions of the Model 
 
The version of Radical Indigenism that I propose offers three 
assumptions for guiding dialogue about tribal political identity. The first 
two, practicality and spirituality, are derived from Garroutte; the third, 
reflection on the effects of colonization, is my own. 
 
1. Role of Practical Knowledge 
 
The first assumption of the model emphasizes the practical quality of 
the pursuit of knowledge. Knowledge exists first and foremost for the sake 
of making a concrete difference in the lived world of tribal members.  This 
means, as Garroutte states, that the definition of tribal identity must “be 
robust, allowing for sufficiently strong community boundaries”: 
 
But it should be flexible as well, because flexibility allows for 
the embrace of those who truly belong to the community, even if 
they do not satisfy certain technical criteria of membership. 
Flexibility allows the community to remain open to the entry of 
new and valued resources.254 
Freedmen’s descendents, as well as members of the other “adopted” 
groups who contribute to the life of the Nation, have a stake as citizens in 
constructing membership criteria that are robust: clear, bright-line rules that 
establish boundaries between citizens and non-citizens. For the reasons 
discussed above, the exclusive authority of the Dawes Rolls should be 
abandoned.255 In dialogue with Cherokees by ancestry, new legal 
touchstones could be identified for citizenship. These might include 
Cherokee census rolls prepared prior to the Dawes Rolls by Cherokees 
themselves;256 rolls in dispute that allegedly include names of Freedmen or 
their descendents that were elided by the Dawes Rolls (Wallace Roll, Kern-
Clifton Roll); some combination of these rolls; or rolls plus other indicia of 
 
254 Id. at 115 (emphasis in original). 
255 I acknowledge it would be difficult to achieve this decentering. As Carole Goldberg 
has observed, “Once a roll is established as the basis for citizenship, it becomes politically 
difficult to expand citizenship beyond its confines.”  Goldberg, Members Only?, supra note 
104, at 458.  Nonetheless, the assumption of practicality requires citizenship criteria to be 
flexible, as well as bounded, and for that reason I propose the alternatives set forth above. 
256 Justice Leeds, writing for the Lucy Allen majority, noted that “[t]he Dawes Rolls 
were not created by the federal government from scratch. When the Dawes Commission 
compiled its rolls, they referred to previous Cherokee Nation census records which also 
included a broad citizenry.  Most of the people listed on the Dawes Rolls will also appear 
on the Cherokee Nation’s own tribally censuses that pre-date the Dawes Rolls. The 
Cherokee Nation’s own censuses included Freedmen in addition to ‘native Cherokees,’ 
intermarried whites, and Indians of other tribes, all of whom were recognized by the 
Cherokee Nation as citizens.”  Lucy Allen, at 6. 
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genealogical connection deemed reliable by the Nation (on analogy with the 
“ancient documents” exception to the hearsay rule).257 
The aim of this reform is two-fold: to decenter the Dawes Rolls as the 
exclusive authority for Cherokee citizenship and subordinate the Dawes 
Rolls to a larger genus, determined by the tribe, which might be called, 
simply, “reliable records”; and, second, to introduce flexibility into 
citizenship criteria by creating a range of authorities through which a 
prospective tribal member could attempt to establish citizenship. One can 
imagine a default system which privileged a certain set of rolls for 
citizenship, accompanied by a principled mechanism for vetting special 
cases, where those whose ancestors had failed to enroll, or whose 
enrollment allegedly had been lost, could attempt to establish ancestral 
relationship with the Nation, perhaps by means of “ancient documents.”  
This would respect the role of practical knowledge to establish citizenship 
criteria that are both robust and flexible. 
 
2. Relationship to Spiritual Heritage 
 
The second assumption of Radical Indigenism focuses on the 
“attentiveness” of Native American communities to “the distinctly spiritual 
dimensions of inquiry.”258 Garroutte focuses on the sense of many tribes 
that they have “a specific spiritual role to play in the world: a particular 
place to occupy and a particular task to perform.”259 Tribal stories of origin 
often embody charges variously called “Original Instructions” or “First 
Instructions,” which “usually concern coming into relationship with other 
beings—human and nonhuman—in the natural world in particular ways.”260 
Garroutte observes that “[a] definition of identity that acknowledges this 
spiritual heritage will recall each tribal community to its Original 
Instructions—to its specific teachings about the nature of the world and how 
its members are to live in it.”261 Further, because tribes routinely interact 
with non-members, those engaged in dialogue on the spiritual dimensions of 
their identity will ask who should be invited “to join them in their sacred 
work,” that is, who should be asked to share the burden of executing the 
Original Instructions that frame their lives.262 
The Cherokee Nation expressly understands itself as performing a 
unique and sacred mission in the world. In document entitled Declaration of 
Designed Purpose, prepared by the “Chad Smith-Hastings Shade 
administration” and dated 2001, the Cherokee Nation elaborates a statement 
of “vision, mission and guiding principles to lead the Cherokee Nation for 
 
257 The “ancient documents” exception to the hearsay rule as codified in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence allows into evidence probative “statements in a document in existence 
twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established.” F.R.E. Rule 803 (16). 
258 GARROUTTE, supra note 40, at 114 (emphasis in original). 
259 Id. at 115. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. at 115-16. 
262 Id. at 116. 
20-Aug-06] CHEROKEE FREEDMEN 59
the 21st century.”263 Citing the words of early-twentieth century Cherokee 
traditionalist Redbird Smith (“I have always believed that the Great Creator 
had a great design for my people, the Cherokees”), the Declaration lists 
“Spirit” as the first “guiding principle” for “the decisions that drive the 
behaviors, feelings, and attributes necessary” for achieving desired tribal 
outcomes.264 Under “Spirit,” the Declaration states, “We believe that the 
Creator has a great design for us and acknowledge that every Cherokee is 
part of the ever-renewing, ever-expanding, upward progressive movement 
of life.”265 The Declaration is consistent with other official statements of 
the Nation in acknowledging the significance of spirituality for Cherokee 
identity, but not imposing a specific theology, creed, or set of religious 
practices as a litmus-test for citizenship.266 Other Cherokees put it more 
plainly: in the words of Julie M., a Keetoowah grandmother interviewed by 
Garroutte, “We [Cherokees] . . . have a special place in the world. God put 
us here.”267 
The construction of Cherokee Nation citizenship criteria according to 
Radical Indigenism, therefore, would assume the salience of Cherokee 
spiritual self-understanding to the dialogue. Whether the Declaration of 
Designed Purpose endures is less important for a dialogue on citizenship 
than the legitimacy of religious discourse found among many Cherokee 
people as a means of expressing their fundamental orientation in the world.  
Sturm points out while “many Cherokees share a common spiritual 
cosmology,” the religious beliefs and practices of Oklahoma Cherokee are 
complex, and practitioners typically consist of Cherokee Baptists (a 
variation of Southern Baptists, inflected by elements of traditional Cherokee 
culture and religion) and practitioners of traditional Cherokee religion 
centered on the Sacred Fire (the Keetoowah Society).268 Cherokees, whether 
descendents of Freedmen, “blood Indians,” or others, would be expected to 
engage in a conversation where citizenship is understood as more than the 
 
263 Declaration of Designed Purpose, Cherokee Phoenix and Indian Advocate, Fall 
2001, http://www.cherokee.org/Phoenix/XXVno4_Fall2001/ddp1.htm (last visited August 
16, 2006). 
264 Id. The “desired outcomes” are listed as “exercise sovereignty,” “achieve optimal 
performance [by setting ‘benchmarks’ for ‘each operating team’],” “build Cherokee Nation 
employees,” “encourage tribal members,” and “use culture/knowledge.” Id. 
265 Id.
266 Article III, Section 4 of the 1999 Cherokee Constitution provides “[t]he Council 
shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion.” The 1999 Constitution includes 
no correlate to the federal Establishment Clause. The Preamble of the 1999 Constitution 
“acknowledges with humility and gratitude the goodness, aid and guidance of the 
Sovereign Ruler of the Universe” in allowing the “People of the Cherokee Nation” to 
“preserve our sovereignty, enrich our culture, achieve and maintain a desirable measure of 
prosperity and the blessings of freedom.”  See Comparison of the 1976 and 1999 
Constitutions, 
http://www.cherokee.org/TribalGovernment/Executive/CCC/ccc1999Changes.pdf (last 
visited August 16, 2006). 
267 GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 115 (emphasis in original). 
268 STURM, supra note 58, at 127.  The complexities of race, religion, and Cherokee 
identity are considered by Sturm, id. at 124-31.  
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negotiation of a social contract, but rather represents the interpretation of 
sacred “Original Instructions.”269 Understood as a discussion guided by 
Cherokee assumptions about their place in the world, a conversation on 
citizenship would explore whether the Freedmen’s descendents have a civic 
role to play in the Nation’s “designed purpose,” and how that role, if it 
exists, might best be performed. 
 
3. Effective History of Colonization 
 
Third, I would add to Garroutte’s model the assumption that the social 
construction of Native American identities proceeds within a political, legal, 
and rhetorical matrix that embodies centuries of Euroamerican domination 
and indigenous peoples’ resistance.270 As a result, tribal members’ 
constructs of themselves and “others” may consciously or unconsciously 
reflect ideologies of race, class, and other divisions, which implicitly 
devalue Native Americans themselves and marginalize Native Americans’ 
access to their own histories and cultures.271 The assumption of the 
effective history272 of colonization, therefore, also will inform the model. 
 The dialogue on Cherokee citizenship would presume the relevance of 
Euroamerican history for the Nation, not as a story of Cherokee victimhood 
or triumphalism, but as a story of colonization cutting across lines of tribe, 
race, gender, and economic status. The dialogue would be difficult and 
would of necessity include a searching look at how Cherokee government 
has been influenced by and at times embraced (in academic jargon) 
Euroamerican racial hegemony and ideology. Of necessity, the dialogue 
would ask participants to consider the history of the Freedmen, and explore 
how their history and that of the Cherokees “by blood” have intersected 
under the influence of colonialism, and how that influence may continue to 
shape even the dialogue itself. 
 
269 In 1996 the Nation reported that approximately 39 percent of its citizens lived 
outside Oklahoma. Id. at 11. This large non-resident population poses particular difficulties 
for such a dialogue, since one cannot assume a common religious culture among residents 
of states as diverse as California and Texas (to name two states where many Cherokees 
reside), where Cherokee identity may be predicated on other values. 
270 See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL 
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990) (critical legal history of Euroamerican 
engagement with indigenous peoples of the Americas). 
271 On the uses and limits of critical social theory for understanding Native American 
identity politics, see STURM, supra note 58, at 19-26. See also Russel Lawrence Barsh, The 
Challenge of Indigenous Self-Determination, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 277 (1993) (on 
harsh impact of colonialism on social and political trends in Indian Country). 
272 “Effective history” is a concept taken from the work of philosopher Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, and means, in this context, the abiding impact of Euroamerican colonization on 
indigenous peoples and their apprehension of the world. See Francis J. Mootz III, The 
Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work 
of Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur 68 B.U. L. REV. 523, 529 (1988) (“understanding is 
never subjective behaviour toward a given 'object,' but towards its effective history—the 
history of its influence”) (quoting HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD xix 
(1960; trans. 1975)). 
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The three assumptions stated above—practicality, spirituality, and an 
effective history of colonization—may be described as three values for 
Cherokee citizenship criteria: a good criterion must serve the practical 
function of distinguishing members and non-members while remaining 
flexible to changing circumstances; it must respond to an overarching 
Cherokee vision of the tribe’s purpose in the world, and it must be attuned 
to how the inheritance of colonialism may be at work in the Nation today. 
How, then, to proceed? 
 
C. Critical Hermeneutics of Ancestry and Reciprocity 
 
The point of departure for many tribal communities seeking to 
understand themselves, Garroutte, writes, is tradition.  “A common 
assumption of American Indian knowledge pursuits,” she states, “is that the 
seeker always looks backwards.”273 The bearers of tradition include tribal 
elders, whose reflections on tribal identity should central to the dialogue; 
oral and written narratives of the tribe’s history, its creation myths, and 
other bodies of teachings; and the “records of historic practice and forms of 
community life or social structure.”274 By triangulating among elders’ 
statements, oral and written tribal narratives, and community social forms, 
testing each body of evidence against the others, tribal members, acting 
collectively, can identify traditional tribal principles. With Garroutte, I 
propose that a useful principle of identity, which is consonant with the 
traditional principles of many tribes, is that of kinship.275 Below I will 
examine how kinship operates in two modes for determining tribal 
citizenship: the relationship to ancestry and the responsibility to reciprocity. 
 
1. Relationship to Ancestry 
 
Legal scholar Angela Riley writes, “Indian tribes reflect the most 
intimate associations of human experience: they are, by definition, families. 
Indian tribes are bound by bloodlines, clan identifiers, and kinship. 
Ancestry or descent often constitutes the dominant factor in determining 
whether one belongs to an Indian tribe.”276 Carole Goldberg observes, 
“biological relationship has always formed some part, often a significant 
part, of tribal belonging.”277 Garroutte notes that for some Native 
Americans, such as author Scott Momaday, the relationship to one’s 
ancestors can only be expressed as a “memory in the blood,” a heritable 
“race memory” that flows from one generation to the next.278 Rather than 
reject such expressions out of hand as fragments of colonialist racial 
hegemony, Garroutte finds that when understood in the context of 
 
273 GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 117. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. at 118. 
276 Riley, supra note 39, manuscript at 41-42. 
277 Goldberg, Members Only?, supra note 104, at 460. 
278 GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 120. 
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traditional authorities (elders’ statements and sacred stories), claims such as 
Momaday’s do not exhibit the characteristics of nineteenth-century race 
science, but show “a sacred logic to which notions of genealogical distance 
and blood quantum are foreign and even irrelevant.”279 Garroutte invites us 
to consider the possibility of indigenous (sacred) and non-indigenous 
(colonialist) essentialisms, and to embrace the former as legitimate modes 
of establishing Native American kinship and thus identity.280 
Garroutte’s efforts to distinguish race-based notions of ancestral 
affinity such as Momaday’s from the racist notions of biological hierarchies 
criticized earlier in this Article are intriguing, but would be more 
persuasive, I believe, had she incorporated the third assumption of an 
effective history of colonialism. Taken alone, the traditional authorities of 
elders’ testimony, sacred texts, and community practices are not exempt 
from the influences of colonialism:281 as Garroutte herself clearly sees, there 
are no “pristine” tribal cultural resources to draw on;282 therefore, a critical-
historical perspective is needed to prevent the hermeneutic of traditional 
principles such as kinship from automatically reproducing and re-
entrenching colonialist ideologies as the basis for citizenship criteria.  
 Such a critical hermeneutic of tribal tradition would operate within 
tribes themselves, to identify and discard—or retain—notions of race, 
gender, and other forms of difference that have inflected and formed their 
traditional authorities over the course of perhaps centuries. An exploration 
of operative colonialist essentialisms would also create the logical space 
within which tribes could identify and discuss examples of kinship 
consistent with Garroutte’s “indigenous essentialism.” The resulting 
citizenship criteria may not satisfy critics of tribal sovereign immunity, who 
would utilize extra-tribal criteria to avoid outcomes “anathema in a society 
 
279 Id. at 125. 
280 See id. at 122-25. 
281 Examples of tribal stories of origin or revelation inflected by the race-values of 
colonialism are common.  See, e.g., the syncretic Shawnee-Christian version of the Garden 
of Eden story, in which the Great Spirit (God) visits punishments on his three disobedient 
children—white, red, and black—appropriate to “an ineradicable hierarchy of races,” in 
McLoughlin, Red Indians, supra note 132, at 378.  See also id. at 373-74 (Seneca and 
Shawnee theological constructs incorporating racial hierarchies).  On issues raised today by 
the religious syncretism of Christian and indigenous spiritualities, see, e.g., Theresa S. 
Smith, The Church of the Immaculate Conception: Inculturation and Identity among the 
Anishnaabeg of Manitoulin Island, in NATIVE AMERICAN SPIRITUALITY: A CRITICAL 
READER 145-56, 146-47 (Lee Irwin, ed. 2000). 
282 Garroutte criticizes very effectively the myth of Indian essentialism in GAROUTTE,
supra note 40, at 67-69, referencing the trial of the Mashpees, who failed to establish 
sufficient “Indian-ness” to assert a claim for lost ancestral lands. See also JAMES CLIFFORD,
Identity in Mashpee, in THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE 323 (1988) (logic of cultural 
“authenticity” makes no allowance for “sharp contradictions, mutations, or emergencies” 
that comprise lived history); Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Frontiers of Legal Thought 
III: Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 625 (Mashpees’ story rendered unintelligible and thus legally irrelevant by 
dominant culture’s history and social practices); and GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 136-39 
(disavowing static notions of tradition and defining indigenous traditions as modes of 
thinking and acting that correspond to tribes’ sacred Original Instructions).  
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ruled by laws”283 (and their own preferences), but the criteria would be the 
result of an intra-tribal process where traditional principles, such as kinship, 
were generated only after the effective historical consequences of 
colonialism had been “named” and debated. 
 While kinship ties are typically obtained by birth within a tribal 
community, they can also be created through adoption. While the clan 
system still operated as the primary unit of society, Cherokee “[c]lans 
frequently adopted prisoners of war to supplement their own numbers and 
to replace kinsmen who had died or been killed.”284 White men in the late 
1700s who associated themselves with Cherokee towns were occasionally 
adopted by clans but usually not.285 In the nineteenth century, as the clan 
system was overtaken by the model of citizenship, “American men who 
married Cherokee women could then seek legal rights in the Cherokee 
Nation without participating in the traditional ritual of adoption.”286 When 
the Cherokees adopted the Freedmen and their descendents into the Nation 
by the Treaty of 1866 and constitutional amendments of 1866, and later 
extended citizenship to intermarried whites, Shawnee, and Delaware, they 
did so against a background of Cherokee adoption practices which, while 
never extensive or a challenge to the primacy of ancestry, were nonetheless 
sufficiently common to have engendered their own rituals.287 
Garroutte argues that the “kinship substance” communicated through 
birth may also be ritually transferred through adoption ceremonies.  
Referring to the rituals of the Iroquois, she states, “[adoptees] entered the 
ceremony as one kind of being, and they emerged another.  The kinship 
substance thus acquired is real and consequential, enabling new 
relationships—both social and physical.”288 Examples of Native American 
adoption practices, she argues, “challenge the accusation that essentialist 
claims are necessarily racist: the essentialisms explored here have nothing 
to with the idea of race, a concept rooted in the same biologistic 
assumptions that have driven social scientific studies of kinship.”289 
283 Reitman, supra note 250, at 804. 
284 PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 8. Captives who were not killed were either 
adopted into clans, or existed as servants in a kind of social limbo outside the clan system.  
Id. at 3-18 (discussing the social status of such captives, called the atsi nahsa’i). See also 
Goldberg, Members Only?, supra note 104, at 460 (arguing “tribes may have been more 
willing to adopt outsiders at a time when they were less likely to feel threatened that the 
adoptees’ worldview and culture would overwhelm their own by virtue of material power 
and sheer numbers”; also, “earlier practices of adoption and incorporation may also have 
been shaped by concerns for population loss due to warfare and disease that do not 
preoccupy some tribes today.”). 
285 MCLOUGHLIN, CHEROKEE RENASCENCE, supra note 146, at 31 (1986). 
286 Yarbrough, supra note 175, at 387. 
287 Yarbrough, in her discussion of slavery and citizenship, stresses that “[a]ncestry 
was an important component of Cherokee identity and legitimate membership in the 
Nation, and the Council passed laws that recognized ancestry and its connection to the 
privileges of citizenship.”  Id. at 395. 
288 GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 127. 
289 Id.
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Garroutte’s analysis of the traditional principle of kinship leads her to 
conclude that ancestry is not the only way that some tribes establish full-
fledged membership.  While genealogical relationship remains primary for 
most tribes, the possibility exists, “at least in principle, for people of any 
race to be brought into kinship relations through the transformative 
mechanism of ceremony.”290 Here again, however, it would seem advisable 
to avoid the unreflective application of adoption practices, perhaps 
developed for a different age, or under the conditions of colonialism, to 
tribal communities.291 Ceremonies of transformation (e.g., baptisms and bar 
mitzvahs, to choose two common non-indigenous examples) exist to 
perform operative acts on individuals through correct ritual performance: 
when properly done, the individual is a substantially different person with 
new social rights and obligations.292 The model of Radical Indigeneity, as I 
propose it, assumes the critical assessment of tribal ceremonies of adoption 
and the identification of their implicit or express assignment of social, 
racial, and gender roles prior to their implementation by tribes. 
 A question that a Cherokee dialogue with the Freedmen’s descendents 
might wish to ask is whether the Nation possesses, or cares to recover or 
create, such transformative mechanisms of adoption, and make them 
available to the Freedmen’s descendents, particularly inasmuch as the 
descendents’ political identity as citizens appears to hinge on successfully 
negotiating their social identity as Cherokee “kin.” Claiming political 
membership in the polity based on what some regard as a “shot-gun” treaty 
and an unpopular judicial decision is no substitute for negotiating social 
legitimacy as Cherokees. Without the latter, achieved through difficult, 
face-to-face dialogues among all affected parties, it is doubtful whether the 
former—citizenship status—can be long maintained. The responsibility to 
reciprocity, described below, may offer hope for such a negotiation of social 
legitimacy.  
 
2. Responsibility to Reciprocity 
 
If, as Garroutte notes, relationship to ancestry represents Native 
American being, the second dimension of kinship, responsibility to 
reciprocity, indicates Native doing: what religious studies scholar 
Christopher Jocks describes as the “ability to participate in kinship.”293 To 
 
290 Id. 
291 See John Comaroff & Jean Comaroff, The Colonization of Consciousness, in A 
READER IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF RELIGION 493-510, 507 (2002) (in the context of South 
Africa,, distinguishing two levels in the colonization of consciousness: conversion by an 
ideological message, and “inculcation of the hegemonic forms, the taken-for-granted signs 
and practices, of the colonizing culture.”). 
292 JOHN SKORUPSKI, SYMBOL AND THEORY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF THEORIES OF 
RELIGION IN SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 101 (1976) (“Operative actions are performed in 
order to create or cancel a set of rights and obligations.”). 
293 GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 118; quoting Christopher Jocks, American Indian 
Religious Traditions and the Academic Study of Religion: A Response to Sam Gill, 65 
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF RELIGION 169-76, 172 (1997). 
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understand this dimension I believe it is necessary to appreciate how very 
differently indigenous communities and Euroamerican societies conceive 
the basis of social obligation. For those acculturated in the Enlightenment’s 
tradition of atomistic agency, obligations arise paradigmatically through the 
free actions of autonomous individuals, represented in the classic notion of 
contract as a “bargained-for exchange of promises.”294 
Tribal communities, on the other hand, often understand themselves as 
existing in fundamental relationship with their physical surroundings; not as 
societies floating in incidental or accidental relation to particular geographic 
spaces, but as distinct peoples dwelling within a web of physical, spiritual, 
and moral relationships with places.295 Native American spiritual traditions 
are often, though not always, site-specific, meaning that the religious and 
cultural identities of the people, and their ethical obligations,296 depend 
upon particular places where the Original Instructions—the purpose of the 
tribe for the world—can be competently interpreted by the elders, medicine 
men and women, and other qualified tribal members, or effectively 
performed in ceremonies of renewal.297 
Further, for many tribes, dwelling implies engagement in highly 
interpersonal relations with a broader ontology than that recognized by 
Western philosophy and science: animals, plants, people, gods, geological 
forms, meteorological events, celestial entities, and spirit beings, to name 
but a few.298 This dwelling, and these relationships, constitute a web of life 
 
294 “Contract. An agreement between two or more persons which creates an obligation 
to do or not to do a particular thing.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 291 (5th ed.) 
295 See KEITH H. BASSO, WISDOM DWELLS IN PLACES: LANDSCAPE AND LANGUAGE 
AMONG THE WESTERN APACHE (1996), esp. 3-135 (on Apache place-making) and 106-107 
(“dwelling is said to consist in the multiple ‘lived relationships’ that people maintain with 
places, for it is solely by virtue of these relationships that space acquires meaning.”) 
296 Deloria writes, “Spatial thinking requires that ethical systems be related directly to 
the physical world and real human situations, not abstract principles, are believed to be 
valid at all times and under all circumstances. One could project, therefore, that space must 
in a certain sense precede time as a consideration for thought.”  DELORIA, GOD IS RED,
supra note 252, at 72. 
297 There is an extensive literature addressing the efforts of Native Americans to 
negotiate their spiritual traditions within the constraints of Anglo-American law. See, e.g., 
Kristin A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a Place 
for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1065 (2005) (arguing that “Indian 
nations can assert that even as nonowners, they may have enforceable rights at sacred sites 
located on federal public lands.”). For a sense of how far federal constitutional 
jurisprudence has not come since the pivotal case, Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective 
Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (no Free Exercise Clause protection, absent 
governmental coercion, for burdens on religious liberty of Pacific Northwest Indian tribes’ 
religious uses of public lands, where logging road’s construction would devastate tribal 
culture and religion), see the analysis of the court in Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 
408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 904 (2006) (applying Lyng to find no Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act protection, absent governmental coercion, for burdens on religious liberty of Navajo, 
Apache, Hopi and other tribes, where expansion of snowmaking on sacred San Francisco 
Peaks using graywater would devastate tribal culture and religion). 
298 Deloria expressly describes the relationship of humans and other species as one of 
kinship: “The essence of the Indian attitude toward peoples, lands, and other life forms is 
one of kinship relations in which no element of life can go unattached from human society. 
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which serves as the basis for reciprocal interactions.  As Garroutte notes, 
while social science defines kinship in terms of human descent, many 
Native Americans view kinship, and the obligations of kinship, much more 
broadly, to encompass all that is.299 
The critical interpretation of what Deloria calls the “Indian attitude” 
toward people, land, and other life forms does not require one to bracket the 
truth or falsity of indigenous claims about reality, much less deny them. The 
elders’ accounts of aboriginal history, stories of origination (of the cosmos, 
people, animals, and other kin), the complex medicines that keep the world 
in balance, and the social structures and rituals that embody the teaching 
and continuation of the “Indian attitude” cannot be challenged from within a 
critical hermeneutics oriented by the assumptions of Radical Indigeneity.  
 At the same time, it is appropriate to ask, from within one’s tribal 
community, to what extent the tribe’s present-day understanding of 
indigenous kinship relations reflects Euroamerican biases of, for example, 
space, time, history, and community.300 It is especially important in this 
regard to examine the influence of Christianity on understandings of 
kinship, where many tribal spiritual traditions for centuries came under the 
influence of missionaries.301 Indeed, the critical examination of such 
understandings of kinship may serve as an act of cultural recovery. Critical 
assessment of traditional source material and dialogue with the community 
and its elders can reveal where, for example, Western dichotomies between 
irreconcilable “spiritual” and “material” worlds, “souls” and “bodies,” 
“rational animals” and “irrational nature,” or incompatible “subjects” and 
“objects” may have elided indigenous worldviews and attenuated the scope 
of kinship responsibilities, including responsibilities of political 
participation, that tribes may wish to resume, insofar as they can. 
 The “common spiritual cosmology”302 shared by many Cherokees, 
often foregrounded by individual commitments to Christianity or the 
Keetoowah Society, provides the basis for strong indigenous kinship 
relations which bear directly on Cherokee identity. Sturm’s informants 
 
. . . With respect to other life forms, this attitude manifests itself in what one could call 
‘kinship’ cycles of responsibility that exists between our species and other species.” VINE 
DELORIA, JR., Native American Spirituality, in FOR THIS LAND: WRITINGS ON RELIGION IN 
AMERICA 131 (James Treat, ed. 1999). 
299 GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 132 (“Humans are merely one set of participants in the 
vast cycles of giving and receiving, of covenant and celebration, that constitute relationship 
to a tribal kinship community.”). 
300 See, e.g., DELORIA, GOD IS RED, supra note 252, at 61-75 (“Thinking in Time and 
Space”); id. at 97-112 (“The Concept of History”). 
301 See, e.g., DELORIA, Christianity and Indigenous Religion: Friends or Enemies?, in 
FOR THIS LAND, supra note 298, at 145-61; NATIVE AND CHRISTIAN: INDIGENOUS VOICES 
ON RELIGIOUS IDENTITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (James Treat, ed. 1996); and 
Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century 
Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 773 (1997). 
302 STURM, supra note 58, at 127. The best-known Euroamerican account of the 
Cherokee cosmology is the work of 19th-century anthropologist, James Mooney.  See 
MOONEY, supra note 129.  
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emphasize that “[s]pirituality is the most important thing in the traditional 
Cherokee world because we use it to maintain life as we know it and to 
survive through periods of turmoil” and “[a] Cherokee has to be brought up 
knowing their culture, the medicine way of life. They have to go out into 
the woods and know roots and foods and medicine.”  However, they also 
state, “But [Cherokees] also need to be able to survive with European 
ways.” Another informant stated, “Cherokee religion is real important to 
me. . . . Me and my family, we visit with the medicine man and the little 
people. I know the difference between good and bad medicine, even if I 
have a college degree.”303 For these Cherokees, negotiating Euroamerican 
“ways” occurs against the background of a rich and expansive kinship 
system which implies relationships of reciprocity. 
 The Cherokee Nation in its Declaration of Designed Purpose appears 
to allude to such a larger notion of kinship, when it states, in a section 
captioned “Identity”: 
 
The government of the Cherokee Nation acknowledges that 
Cherokee identity has been formulated over time and consists of 
shared patterns of behavior that include language, ceremony, 
customs, values, beliefs, traditions, wisdom and knowledge, 
along with other tangible and intangible forces, that combined 
are referred to as the Cherokee lifeways or culture.304 
More specifically, the Declaration declares that “[t]he Mission of the 
Cherokee Nation is ‘ga du gi’—working together as individuals, families 
and communities for a quality of life for this and future generations by 
promoting confidence, Cherokee culture and an effective sovereign 
government.”305 Chief Smith and his administration have made ga-du-gi 
the organizing principle of national life.  In his 2005 Status Report to the 
Nation, Chief Smith stated: 
As Cherokees well know, the best way to get anything done is 
the traditional way of working together, ga-du-gi. In order to 
keep our communities strong now and into the next century, we 
are applying the concept of ga-du-gi in every department, 
program and business at the Cherokee Nation. To do this we 
have passed a law that requires a self-help component for all of 
our programs. . . . Community. Jobs. Language. Deputy 
Principal Chief Joe Grayson and I continue our commitment to 
the true community spirit of Cherokee people, ga-du-gi, to 
 
303 Id. at 126-27.  The reference to “the little people” or Yunwi Tsunsdi, refers to a 
fixture of Cherokee culture, that “race of spirits” (Mooney) who inhabit Cherokee 
woodlands and offer assistance or harm depending on whether their customs and privacy 
are respected.  See MOONEY, supra note 129, at 333-34. 
304 Declaration of Designed Purpose, supra note 263. 
305 Id. 
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providing economic opportunity, and to our distinct Cherokee 
Culture.306 
I would argue that ga-du-gi—“all working together”—is a particular 
manifestation of a Cherokee kinship system which links citizens with that 
larger world referenced by the Cherokee cosmology. As prosaic and 
“Western” as a call for cooperation and self-help may seem to be, it would 
be a mistake to infer from the Declaration or Status Report that either its 
author or intended audience understand ga-du-gi as merely an exhortation 
to “pitch in and pull together”: the invocation of a formative Cherokee 
concept in the sacred Cherokee language would evoke for both speaker and 
listener an obligation to realize their “designed purpose” for the sake of the 
world.307 
This second dimension of kinship, relationship to reciprocity, 
challenges Cherokees “by blood” and Freedmen’s descendents who are 
interested in citizenship to discuss and determine their respective roles in 
the world according to ga-du-gi as the social expression of the traditional 
Cherokee cosmology, as interpreted by the elders and found in the tribe’s 
texts, stories, and communal structures. Many Freedmen’s descendents 
“possess as much if not more Cherokee culture” than “white-Cherokees.”308 
As Marilyn Vann has said, Freedmen’s descendents “know a lot more about 
a stomp dance, hog fry, and wild onion dinner than anything about 
Africa.”309 This suggests that some descendents may share assumptions 
with “blood” Cherokees regarding the cosmos and its familial 
interconnections. There may be shared cultural roots to sustain the moral 
imperatives of ga-du-gi. Stated differently, how would Freedmen’s 
descendents contribute to ga-du-gi, the up-building of the Nation, and the 
articulation and performance of the Nation’s “designed purpose”? And 
what, in turn, are the obligations of ga-du-gi from “blood” Cherokees to the 
descendents of their former slaves, now fellow citizens? A dialogue 
between these groups, as difficult as it would be, could strive to identify and 
articulate shared cultural roots to help them assess whether the political 
definition of Cherokees today ought to continue to include citizenship for 
the Freedmen’s descendents. 
 
306 Cherokee Nation Status Report 2005, supra note 54. 
307 See Declaration of Designed Purpose, supra note 263 (“We are endowed with 
intelligence, we are industrious, we are loyal, and we are spiritual but we are overlooking 
the particular Cherokee mission on earth, for no man nor race is endowed with these 
qualifications without a designed purpose.”) (quoting Redbird Smith). 
308 STURM, supra note 58, at 196. Malcomson observes that “many of the black slaves 
of Indians identified with Indian culture. They often spoke the tribal language. They 
prepared Indian dishes and participated, however, peripherally, in Indian festivals such as 
the Cherokees’ Green Corn celebration.” MALCOMSON, supra note 211, at 98-99. 
309 CLAUDIO SAUNT, BLACK, WHITE, AND INDIAN: RACE AND THE UNMAKING OF AN 
AMERICAN FAMILY 65 (2005). 
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CONCLUSION 
To return to Marilyn Vann’s pointed question, is the Cherokee Nation 
“a race or a nation?” Clearly, it is a nation. But will it be a nation based on 
race? At this crossroads in Cherokee history, the controversy in the 
Cherokee Nation over the political status of the Freedmen’s descendents has 
tended to frame the options for voters as a choice between “blood” or base 
rolls: citizenship as a reflection of Cherokee lineal descent or citizenship as 
a function of a legal regime embedded in the federal Dawes Rolls. Though 
the two options intertwine in effect—the Dawes Rolls authorize which 
“blood” will lead to citizenship—they are analytically distinct. As I have 
attempted to show in this Article, neither alternative is adequate to resolve 
the crisis of Cherokee political and social identity.  
 The rights of citizenship promised to Freedmen and their descendents 
by the Treaty of 1866 and the 1866 amendments to the Cherokee 
Constitution have been consistently and effectively resisted by tribal 
leadership virtually since they were announced. The listing of Freedmen or 
their descendents on the Dawes Rolls in the early twentieth century 
provided no insurance against resistance to their citizenship rights, 
including the right to vote in tribal elections, up to the day Lucy Allen was 
decided in 2006 and Freedmen’s descendents were recognized as citizens. 
That Cherokees will go to polls in 2007 to consider amending their 
Constitution to exclude Freedmen’s descendents indicates both the strength 
of the Cherokee political process to effect the will of the people and the 
weakness of the Dawes Rolls to secure rights promised in 1866.   
 On the other hand, biological definitions of Cherokee identity—
“blood”-based identities—are inextricably indebted to the effective history 
of colonialism and its race-based hierarchies. The ready adaptation to and 
deployment of Euroamerican systems of racial classification by Cherokees 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries led to Cherokee slave-holding 
and strict slave codes that permitted Cherokee-white intermarriages but 
prohibited and punished severely relations of intimacy between Cherokees 
and “people of color.”  The Cherokee construction of a national identity 
after 1839 melded a racial commitment to the preservation of Cherokee 
“blood” and the prosperity of the Cherokee Nation. This “blood”-based 
sense of Cherokee identity fit well with the race science of the nineteenth 
century and with the philosophy and public policy of assimilation which 
guided the Dawes Commission in its work of tribal enrollment and 
allotment of land. The resulting Dawes Rolls established race-based 
categorizations of complex social and biological identities of both Native 
Americans and African Americans. When, as now, the Cherokee Nation 
turns to the Dawes Rolls as its exclusive authority for citizenship, it is 
perpetuating those categorizations and their race-value significations by 
embedding them in the very body of the Nation. 
 This Article has proposed that a version of the model of Radical 
Indigeneity created by sociologist Eva Garroutte could provide an 
alternative to forcing Cherokee voters into unwise choices between biology 
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or law. Ancestry is rescued from biology when it is reconceived as a mode 
of kinship. Law is saved from fetishism to the Dawes Rolls when 
sovereignty is exercised to frame new citizenship criteria that are both 
robust and flexible. Engaging the resources of Radical Indigeneity would 
require Cherokees “by blood” and Freedmen’s descendents to participate in 
a sustained and honest dialogue on Cherokee political identity from within 
indigenous norms and authorities and the critical evaluation of Cherokee 
history and culture.  
 The sovereign right of the Cherokee Nation to determine its criteria for 
citizenship should never be denied or compromised by federal intervention. 
The “hard case” of whether to sustain a decision of the Cherokee Nation to 
exclude the Freedmen’s descendents, were the issue to reach federal court 
or the floor of Congress, would surely “make bad law.” The wise use of 
Cherokee sovereignty, however, counsels patience, not a rush to the polls; 
honest, sustained, and no doubt difficult dialogue, not politicking; and the 
critical reinterpretation of cultural resources in the service of kinship, not 
the blind reproduction of divisive racial hegemonies—in short, ga-du-gi,
“all working together.” 
 
